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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the study 
Societies emerging from eras of conflict and repression need to address past mass vio-
lence and human rights abuses in order to establish sustaining peace. Armed conflicts 
place populations in particularly vulnerable positions, the people most affected by the 
armed conflict typically being among the most vulnerable in society.1 Although steps 
forward have been taken in the protection of the individual in situations of armed con-
flicts, in reality, individuals still continue to suffer at the hands of abusive governments 
and other actors, such as armed groups. The high prevalence of gender-based violence 
(GBV) has been documented in various conflict-related contexts.2 The underlying ac-
ceptance of violence, particularly against women, existing within many societies, seems 
to become more outwardly acceptable when conflicts shatter the ordinary, every-day life 
of people.  
 
Gender-based violence can be considered any harmful act directed against individuals 
or groups of individuals on the basis of their gender and it can be translated into a viola-
tion of human rights or a form of discrimination.3 Although men and boys are also tar-
gets of GBV, it is women and girls that still disproportionately make up a majority of 
the victims of gender-based violence in conflicts.4 During armed conflicts, e.g. sexual 
violence is commonly used as a method of warfare to instil fear, to humiliate, control, 
disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of an ethnic group or a community.5 
                                                
1 Evans (2012) p. 137. 
2 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 30 
(2013), para. 39. 
3 The Istanbul Convention, Article 3. Gender-based violence can translate into human rights violation as a 
breach of prohibitions of discrimination, found in several human rights instruments such as CEDAW. 
Another provisions found in human rights conventions, under which violations may fall, are e.g. the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights articles 6 (right to life), 7 (right not to be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), 8 (right not to be subjected to slavery 
or forced labour), 9 (right to liberty and security of the person), 10 (right of all persons deprived of their 
liberty to be treated with dignity) and article 17 (right to private and family life), articles 2, 3 and 18(3) of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ rights and article 2 in the Protocol on the Rights of Women 
in Africa (the Maputo Protocol).  
 
Gender-based violence may include sexual violence, domestic violence, trafficking, forced or early mar-
riage and harmful traditional practices. See Inter-Agency Standing Committee (2005) ‘The Guidelines for 
Gender-Based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Settings’, See also the Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination against Women, general recommendation No. 19 (1992) and Articles 1 and 2 of 
the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993). 
4 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2014). p. 3. Para. 5.  
5 UN-Women (2012), p. 2. 
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Addressing GBV as a human rights matter establishes legal obligations to states and 
therefore compels states to prevent such violence, to punish perpetrators and further-
more, to provide the individual with access to effective remedies and reparation through 
human rights mechanisms.6 
 
Reparations are growingly brought up in dealing with the aftermath of conflicts as the 
attention has started to shift towards a more victim-centred approach in the realm of 
international law. While acts of gender-based violence may account to crimes under 
customary international law, in addition to crimes under the Rome Statute and breaches 
of i.e. the Geneva Conventions, the dichotomy of modern conflicts poses a challenge in 
the search for accountability. When it comes to violations perpetrated during non-
international armed conflicts (furthermore, NIACs), holding perpetrators accountable 
and proving the violations committed by e.g. armed groups is difficult, let alone issuing 
binding decisions on providing victims with reparations. Understanding individuals’ 
rights in the realm of conflicts is the first step in addressing the needs of a victim. 
 
Reparation efforts have historically overlooked women’s and girls’ needs and concerns. 
However, in recent years there has been an increase in recognition of the need for, and 
potential of, reparations acknowledging the gendered nature of violence.7 A study on 
the first decision the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (furthermore, 
the ICC) issued on reparations, the Lubanga case, illustrating the operation of the repa-
rations regime, shows that the ICC’s reparations mandate will have little value for vic-
tims of sexual and gender-based violence unless gender injustices are recognised at each 
and every stage of the investigation and trial process, and pursued with adequate re-
sources.8 The ICC has also yet to come with an outcome pronouncing specifically on 
gender-based crimes and reparations for them. 
 
Effort on the reinvigoration of the existing international humanitarian law (furhermore, 
IHL) mechanisms have been suggested in search for accountability,9 as scholars are 
                                                
6 UN Secretary-general (2016) para. 39.  
7 Progress has been made on the conceptual level, demonstrated by e.g. the Nairobi Declaration Women’s 
and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and Reparation (2007) and by the Special Rapporteur on violence against 
women (VOW) advocating for gender-sensitive reparations for conflict-related sexual violence in e.g. the 
Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2014). 
Reparations have the potential to facilitate the rebuilding of women’s lives: para. 3 of the declaration 
states that ‘reparation must drive post-conflict transformation of socio-cultural injustices, and political 
and structural inequalities that shape the lives of women and girls; that reintegration and restitution by 
themselves are not sufficient goals of reparation, since the origins of violations of women’s and girls’ 
human rights predate the conflict situation’  
8 Chappell (2017) p. 1228, 1236.  
9 ICRC (2003) p. 60. 
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increasingly arguing that the traditional legal construct, considering IHL as a regime 
regulating merely the two parties of a conflict, is no longer perfectly accurate and that 
an individual right to reparations for violations of IHL is emerging.10 Since human 
rights mechanisms were not especially designed to respond to the needs of armed con-
flict victims, it is evident that their ability to answer to their needs is not comprehensive. 
Keeping this in mind, determining, to what extent the existing human rights mecha-
nisms are able to contribute to the realisation of victims’ rights, as well as a study of the 
interpretation of IHL regarding individual rights is in place. 
1.2 African conflicts and reparations 
Numerous armed conflicts take place on the African continent, and an increasing pro-
portion of the actors involved in peacekeeping operations on the continent are African. 
Yet scholarly writing on the regulation of these conflicts lags behind.11 The ICC has 
largely, yet not without criticism, focused its attention on African conflicts, and while 
intervention on the continent may be justified, it has also been accused of taking on cas-
es that were already being addressed by the national courts.12 Bearing in mind the ICC’s 
role as a court of last resort, the main focus in the efforts towards effective realisation of 
a victim’s rights should therefore lie elsewhere. Therefore, it seems useful to examine 
what are the possibilities of victims of gender-based violations of human rights and hu-
manitarian law to obtain reparations, based on the regional human rights instruments, as 
well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (furthermore, the IC-
CPR).  
 
Addressing gender-based violence has historically not been easy in communities and 
traditional settings that however, from the point of view of an individual, hold signifi-
cant cultural authority in Africa. Additionally, formal justice systems may in principle 
offer redress for women, but they will likely face many barriers in accessing them.13 
Studies have shown that formal and traditional justice seem to have little or no coordi-
nation or synergy in their functions, and that very few women actually even access the 
formal justice systems.14 Though traditional justice systems run in communities are 
generally more accessible to women, they may be biased against them. No perfect sys-
                                                
10 See, International Law Association (ILA) (2010).  See also Schwager, ‘in Kolb and Gaggioli (eds.) and 
Gaeta (2011) in Ben-Naftali (ed.) p. 318.  
11 Hailbronner (2016) p.339.  
12 See i.e. discussion on the ICC Forum from March 2013 to January 2014.  
13 See i.e. International Center for Research on Women – Gender-based Violence Prevention Network – 
South African Medical Research Council (2012).  
14 See i.e. Bafaki (2011).  
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tem seems to exist in terms of addressing gender-based violence. Furthermore, Evans 
has previously noted that the issue of reparations has for the time being not received 
sufficient attention in the jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peo-
ple’s Rights (furthermore, the African Commission) either. In some cases, dealing with 
serious violations of human rights, the issue of reparations has not even been ad-
dressed.15 The Inter-American Court and Commission on Human Rights have on the 
contrary succeeded in creating a notably consistent jurisprudence on reparations.16  
 
The existence of regional human rights instruments as well as quasi-judicial, or non-
judicial mechanisms may resonate better in local conditions than global, universal ones. 
Regional systems may offer different degrees of flexibility and room for on the ground-
mechanisms such as commissions and local forms of justice. It seems helpful to study 
whether there in fact is a difference of approach between the regional instruments and 
the ICCPR. As a universal instrument the ICCPR represents the recognition of basic 
rights and fundamental freedoms inherent to all human beings, regardless of geograph-
ical location or citizenship. By reviewing the protection awarded by the ICCPR and the 
African regional instruments, the thesis aims to discover the extent to which the indi-
vidual in Africa can access reparations for gender-violence, in a conflict setting. To 
draw a comparison with a more developed reparations regime and between two regional 
systems, the African regional norms will therefore be compared to the Inter-American 
regional human rights system. Due to the well-developed jurisprudence in the area of 
reparations in the Inter-American system, a comparison between the available African 
regional instruments and the Inter-American Instruments is particularly interesting. As 
regional instruments the both two systems hold the potential to address issues of region-
al nature. As the Human Rights Committee’s contributions to the realm of reparations 
largely arise from its concluding observations and do not have a regional focus, the 
comparative analysis focuses on the case law of the African and the Inter-American 
regional systems.  
1.3 Research question 
This thesis examines the individual’s right to reparation in an armed conflict for gender-
based violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in 
Africa. The main question the thesis seeks to clarify, whether there is a legal basis for a 
right to reparation for an individual victim of gender-based violations occurred during 
                                                
15 Evans (2012) p. 77.  
16 Evans (2012) p. 36. 
5 
an armed conflict. This question can be approached by breaking it down into two sub-
questions; does international humanitarian law grant the individual a right to reparation 
for gender-based violations, e.g. grave breaches of the branch of law? Is international 
human rights law able to provide an individual victim of gender-based, conflict-related 
violence a right to reparation in the context of an armed conflict in Africa?  
 
The study will first (Chapter 2) look at the individual's position in international humani-
tarian law, identifying the influence of international human rights law on the individu-
al’s position in the domain of international law in general. After this, the chapter will 
discuss the interaction between IHL and international human rights law (furthermore, 
IHRL), and their influence in interpreting the bodies of law. Chapter 3 establishes the 
different ways in which the African Commission and the Human Rights Committee 
have read IHL into human rights law provisions and seeks to clarify the impact on the 
individual. Chapter 4 discusses the positions the treaty bodies have taken on the right to 
reparation for gender-based violations of human rights. The chapter draws a comparison 
between the application of the African Charter and its Protocols and the Inter-American 
Convention in order to clarify how the regional instruments differ in their approach to 
reparations for gender-violence in armed conflicts.  
1.4 Limitations 
The thesis takes as a starting point the previously mentioned lack of significant devel-
opments in the ICC regime in awarding gender-sensitive reparations for victims on the 
African continent. Also, since the thesis focuses on the relationship between IHL and 
IHRL, and the applicability of IHRL in armed conflicts, it will therefore not take into 
consideration the contributions of other international criminal tribunals and quasi-
judicial bodies. While using the other international human rights treaty bodies as a 
means to compare and contrast the findings of the research, the focus will be on the Af-
rican human rights mechanism and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.  
 
The thesis will not in detail elaborate on the content of reparations, but will address 
them as a whole. Furthermore, the role of reparations and their ability to reach the in-
tended goals they were meant to reach will not be discussed. The question of the ‘trans-
formative’ nature of reparations, a highly topical conversation on the effects of repara-
tions on the roots and causes in the society leading to gender-based violations, is there-
fore also out of the scope of this paper. The thesis will also not focus on the effects of 
whether it is a group or an individual that is lodging the complaint since The African 
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Charter and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights as well as the American Convention on Human Rights allow for individual com-
plaints regarding violations of the respective conventions. Differentiating between 
group and individual complaints is outside the scope of the thesis since the focus will be 
on the right to reparation, not the content of them.  
1.5 Method and sources 
The main legal sources in international humanitarian law utilized in the paper consist of 
the Hague Convention (IV) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907, the Ge-
neva Conventions (GC I–IV) and their Additional Protocols I and II. Additional sources 
include the case law of the International Court of Justice and its predecessor and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (furthermore the ICRC) customary interna-
tional humanitarian law study. In international human rights law, since the United Na-
tions is considered the main norm-creator for Africa, the role of the United Nations trea-
ty bodies and their jurisprudence is compared with the jurisprudence of the African 
Commission and the Court applying the African Charter, most importantly the Interna-
tional Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the Human Rights Committee as its 
monitoring body.17 Cases referring to or drawing from IHL will particularly be consid-
ered. The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court and Commission regarding repara-
tions for gender-based violence will be discussed as a comparison to understand the 
regional differences in the jurisprudence related to gender-based violence and the re-
sponsibility of the state for violations of gendered nature.    
 
More specific to gender-based violence, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, better known as the Maputo 
protocol will be discussed as an instrument specifically addressing violence against 
women in armed conflicts. Relevant international case law outside of the African con-
text will be referred to as examples of the pre-existing interpretation of the relevant 
rules of IHL and human rights law for this study, since the rules of IHL haven been in-
voked regionally under relevant human rights law provisions included in human rights 
treaties. The ILC articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts18 are 
taken into consideration as a source providing general guidance addressing basic issues 
of responsibility and remedy, irrespective of the primary or substantive rules they may 
be applied to. Their relevance for the purpose of this study is based on their efforts to 
                                                
17 Viljoen (2011) p. 191.  
18  International Law Commission 2001 
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track the current state of international law in order to encourage the progressive devel-
opment of international law and its codification.19  
 
Christine Evans’s study on the right to reparation in international law for victims of 
armed conflict20 provides a basis on which the question of reparations will be discussed. 
As a thorough examination of the right to reparations in armed conflicts, including dif-
ferent types of reparations, Evans’s study allows this thesis to focus on narrower sub-
ject, reparations for gendered violence. Hampson21, Todeschini22 well as Droege23 and 
Hailbronner24 have contributed to the discussion on the relationship between interna-
tional human rights law and IHL from the point of view of human rights instruments, 
while also covering the practical overlap between IHL and human rights law. While 
Todeschini effectively points out the questions evoked by the International Court of 
Justice (furthermore, the ICJ) statements on the relationship between IHL and human 
rights law, Hampson focuses on the treaty body perspective, providing insight on the 
question of the concurrent applicability of IHL and human rights law. Her analysis on 
the different possibilities in interpreting the relationship of the two bodies of law pro-
vides a frame in which the interpretations of the treaty bodies will be observed. Fur-
thermore, Todeschini’s fairly recent assessment of the normative and practical implica-
tions of the Human Rights Committee jurisprudence, pointing out both challenges and 
merits, is considered a prominent voice in the analysis. Droege, highlighting the com-
plementarity on the two bodies of law, shows evidence of the influence of human rights 
law on IHL by pointing out the detailed, yet less protective provisions of IHL, in com-
parison with human rights law. Her arguments provide a more practical view on the 
right to reparation, though ending up creating expectations towards the reparations re-
gime of the ICC. As African contributors, Hailbronner and Viljoen25 mostly concentrate 
specifically on Africa. Viljoen characterizes the African regional approach to the rela-
tionship between IHL and human rights law as interpretative, providing a wide analysis 
of the affairs affected by the relationship and setting the stage for further research.26 
Following Viljoen, Hailbronner seeks to analyse the jurisprudence of the African re-
gional bodies in a global context, providing a basis for the thesis to continue in terms of 
                                                
19 The UN Charter, Article 13 (1) (a) 
20 Evans, Christine (2012) 
21 ICRC, University of Essex, Department of Law and Human Rights  
22 Aarhus University, University of Trento 
23 The Red Cross, University of Jerusalem 
24 Humboldt Research Fellow, Institute for International and Comparative Law, University of Pretoria, 
South Africa 
25 Lecturer of Law, University of Pretoria, South Africa; MA LL.B (Pretoria), LL.M (Cantab), LL.D 
(Pretoria).  
26 Viljoen (2014) p.314. 
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reparations. Celorio’s27 both historical and matter-specific study on the Inter-American 
Court’s approach on reparations and gender offers a point of reference for comparative 
analysis in the last chapter of the thesis.  
                                                
27 Human Rights Specialist, Special Rapporteurship on the Rights of Women, Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights; Professional Lecturer in Law, George Washington University Law School. The 
views expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, 
or the Organization of American States. 
9 
2 REPARATIONS IN IHL AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AP-
PLICABLE IN AFRICA 
2.1 IHL primary rights 
In international law, the right to reparation is generally viewed as a secondary right 
connecting to a primary, substantive right that has been breached.28 In order to find out 
to what extent individuals are granted a right to reparation under IHL it first needs to be 
established whether they actually have primary rights under IHL and secondly, upon the 
occurrence of a breach of a primary right, whether an individual has the right to claim 
reparation under the same branch of law. 
 
As humanitarian rules were originally designed to apply in relationships between states 
in the form of prohibitions, the notion of ‘rights’ was not clearly defined.  Whether in-
dividuals possess rights under the law of armed conflict and can be considered as possi-
ble victims depends on if they can be considered beneficiaries of IHL rules. According 
to Zegveld, the simple recognition of victims of violations of international humanitarian 
law itself already presupposes the existence of individual rights of victims in IHL.29 
Traditionally considered, individuals have indeed been the beneficiaries of the regula-
tions, but not holders of claims, as they were afforded protection as objects, without 
being the subjects holding rights.30 It has been argued that most of IHL provisions gen-
erally address states parties to the Convention, providing them with duties of protection 
without the reference to ‘rights’.31 It has also been argued that many of the treaty provi-
sions relating to the conduct of hostilities are worded as ‘prohibitions’ concerning the 
belligerent parties, rather than actual rights granted to specific persons.32 Based on these 
observations, it has been considered that the individual under these provisions is a mere 
indirect beneficiary of the obligations, which are addressed to the parties to the conflict, 
and which grant the analogous rights only to the belligerent parties.33 
 
However, established the traditional interpretation of IHL has been, references to 
‘rights’ can be found in IHL. The 1949 Geneva Conventions explicitly confer ‘rights’ to 
                                                
28 Zegveld (2003) p.503. 
29 Zegveld (2003) p.503.  
30 Peters (2016) p. 194.  
31 Bilkova (2007) p. 1, Peters (2016) p.194. 
32 Gaeta (2011) p. 318, in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed.), Peters (2016) p. 194. As an example, article 51, para 2, 
of AP I.  
33 Gaeta (2011) p. 319, in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed.).  
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protected persons34 and a number of rules refer precisely to concepts such as ‘rights’, 
‘entitlements’ or ‘benefits’, pointing towards an individual rights holder.35 The multiple 
references to individual rights within the IHL framework date to a time after the 1907 
Hague Convention, to which the origin concept of reparation in IHL has been traced.36  
 
Kleffner argues that one can identify rules containing elements of individual benefits in 
IHL, even without concentrating on specific provisions as examples. As an example, the 
grave breaches provisions could be analysed as conferring individual humanitarian 
rights against acts such as wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body and 
health or torture or inhuman treatment.37 Kleffner professes that the same holds true for 
norms applicable in non-international armed conflicts, such as humiliating and degrad-
ing treatment and the prohibition of violence to life, stipulated in Common Art. 3 and 
Art. 4 of Additional Protocol II.38 Whether these elements could provide a foundation 
for an individual claim is, however, a different question altogether.  
 
Referring to the development of contemporary international law, under which individu-
als are no longer considered as ‘objects’ of rights accruing only to states, Gaeta propos-
es an affirmed standing for individuals as holders of primary rights. Accordingly, it 
would be mindless to affirm that this position as a rights holder would dissolve in a sit-
uation when their need for protection against abuse ‘reaches its peak’ and they are the 
most vulnerable, namely during armed conflicts.39 Furthermore, Gaeta refers to art. 7 of 
GC I, II and III and art. 8 of GC IV which articulate that the protected persons can ‘in 
no circumstances renounce in part or entirety the rights secured to them in the Conven-
tions.’40 These have been referred to as ‘non-disposal clauses’ by Peters; indicators clar-
ifying the intention of the Contracting Parties to indeed lay down individual rights di-
rectly by the Conventions themselves, not only after domestic enactments by the con-
tracting parties.41 Even though the power to renounce legal positions (rights) has been 
                                                
34 Articles such as Art. 7 and 8 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 give protect-
ed persons explicit rights. Prior to that, in the 1929 Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, the concept of “rights” appears in several provisions of the Convention, such as arts. 42 and 62.  
35 Zegveld (2003) p.503  
36As an example, Article 6 of the second Geneva Convention addresses the wounded, sick and ship-
wrecked persons with the right not to be adversely affected by any special agreement between the High 
Contracting Parties, and not to have their rights conferred by the Convention restricted. Other articles 
providing individuals with rights are articles such as Article 7 of the GC I, Articles 7, 14, 84, 105 and 130 
of the GC III, Articles 5, 7, 8, 27, 38, 80 and 146 of the GC IV, Articles 44(5), 45(3), 75 and 85(4) of 
1977 AP I; and Article 6(2) of 1977 AP II. 
37 GC 1 Art. 50, GC 2 Art 51, GC 3 Art 130, GC 4 Art. 147, AP 1 Article 11, AP 1 Article 85.  
38 Kleffner (2002) p.244–245.  
39 Gaeta (2011) in Ben-Naftali (eds.) p. 319.  
40 Gaeta (2011) in Ben-Naftali (eds.) p. 319, Art. 7 of GC I, II and III and art. 8 of GC IV.  
41 Peters (2016) p. 196.  
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considered as evidence of these positions actually belonging to that person, this logic 
should be overlooked in this situation. The reason behind conferring protected persons 
rights accompanied by non-disposal clauses i.e. not allowing the protected person de-
cide themselves when the provisions should be applied or not, was to limit a state’s pos-
sibilities to interfere and exercise their sovereignty. Since the persons concerned are 
typically put under pressure to renounce their rights, the non-disposal clauses would be 
in place to take the incentive away from states from exercising coercion e.g. with pris-
oners of war.42  
 
National courts have addressed the question on individual rights granted by IHL. In the 
Bridge of Varvarin case by a German civil court in Bonn the Court held that in contrast 
to conferring rights, IHL offers ‘protection’ to the individual.43 The Court compared 
IHL to human rights law conventions, asserting that there are no similar provisions in 
IHL granting an individual a procedural right to obtain compensation for the conse-
quences of an armed conflict. In the Netherlands, the Amsterdam District Court, while 
rejecting the applicant claim, recognized the possibility of tracing individual rights from 
the rules of IHL, although confining the right to personally invoke those rights.44 In 
general, the difficulty before national courts has risen with the recognition of the right to 
present a claim towards a state responsible for violations of international humanitarian 
law.45 Quénivet argues that the assertion of the civil court in Bonn ignores the existing, 
although few, legal opportunities to obtain redress on the national level, referring to e.g. 
to the growing number of individuals seeking redress of IHL violations nationally under 
human rights provisions.46  
 
As developments towards a more victim-centric approach to reparations are yet to be 
properly detected and pronounced upon by the courts, the instruments providing guid-
ance and presentiment of the direction the law is headed, are growingly recognising the 
individual.47 As an example, Evans argues that instruments such as the Basic Principles 
                                                
42 Peters. (2016) p. 197.  
43 Bridge of Varvarin case – OLG at para.2863. On the decision see Quénivet (2004) 
44 Dedovic v. Kok et al., para. 5.3.22. 
45 See e.g. the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in the Case concerning jurisdictional immunities 
para. 38a., and the formerly mentioned Bridge of Varvarin case, 2 November 2006, para 10a), where the 
Court states: ‘to this day only the State of nationality is liable for claims of compensation based on unlaw-
ful acts of a foreign state against its citizens, in spite of the development of the level of protection of hu-
man rights which resulted in the recognition that individuals could partly be subjects of international law 
and to the establishment of individual claim cases based on treaties’.  
46 Quénivet (2004) p.183–184.  
47 E.g. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has recognized the interests of victims of IHL 
violations. See also the ‘The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations 
for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’, aspire to strengthen the 
provision of victims of violations of human rights and IHL with a right to a remedy.  
12 
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Violations of 
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law clearly aim to merge IHL and hu-
man rights law and stress the importance of and the obligation to implement domestic 
reparations for victims of armed conflicts.48 Considering the growing voice according to 
which IHL must be interpreted in the light of the development of international law in 
the field of human rights49, the question of the secondary right to reparation and its ex-
istence in IHL deserves an inspection.  
 
2.2 IHL secondary right to reparations and claims under IHL 
If it can be concluded that individuals enjoy primary rights under IHL, as a natural con-
sequence of that, the violation of those rights entitles them to the secondary right to rep-
aration under international law.50 A party is responsibility to provide compensation for a 
breach of its obligations under IHL was explicitly laid down in the 1907 Hague Con-
vention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.51 A similar requirement 
is articulated in Article 91 of Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions.52 Each of 
the Conventions establishes that no High Contracting Party shall absolve itself or any 
other High Contracting Party in respect of grave breaches of the Conventions.53 Given 
the PCIJ statement in the Chorzow Factory case54, Gillard notes that the obligation to 
make reparations automatically arises, without a need to be explicitly spelled in a con-
vention. The rule, according to scholars, represents customary international law and the 
accepted principle of state responsibility, which is also recognised as customary interna-
tional humanitarian law by the ICRC.55 Although the Hague Convention and the Addi-
tional Protocol I use the word compensation, reparation for IHL violations may take 
different and multiple forms, envisaged in other IHL conventions.56 
 
Who was originally meant to be the beneficiary entitled to compensation according to 
article 3 of the Hague Convention of 1907 has been widely discussed. In accordance 
                                                
48 Evans (2012)  p. 5.  
49 Gaeta (2011) in Ben-Naftali (eds.) p. 319. 
50 Gaeta (2011) in Ben-Naftali (eds.) p. 320.  
51 Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.  
52 See Article 91 of the AP I.   
53 Arts. 51, 52, 131 and 148 of the Four Geneva Conventions I–IV.  
54 See Chorzow Factory case para 73.  
55 See Sandoz etl al. (eds.) (1987) para. 3645–3661and Henckaerts, J., et al. (2005). 
56 Gillard (2003) p. 532-533. References to other forms of reparations can be found e.g. in the Protocol to 
the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (Article 3 
mentions the return of unlawfully taken property as restitution.)  
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with a less prevalent view, Kalshoven has argued that the traveaux préparatoires of Ar-
ticle 3 of the Hague Convention IV prove that the provision had originally been intend-
ed to address a state’s liability to compensate individual persons for their losses incurred 
as a direct consequence of detrimental contact with its armed forces.57 He sees civilians 
as the sole benefactors of the article because it seems unlikely that the article would 
have been meant to cover all acts contradicting the provisions. Since it seems highly 
unlikely that article 3 was designed to cover combatants’ complaints, say, of forbidden 
methods of warfare, it seems justifiable to assume the enemy and neutral civilians as the 
intended benefactors of the article.58 According to Kalshoven, the text of the Conven-
tion goes even further when considering the annexed regulations and the intent behind 
them. Articles 52 and 53 of the Regulations59 refer to the obligation of a hostile power 
to pay indemnities in respect of requisitions demanded from the civilian population for 
the necessities of the army occupation, at the conclusion of peace. He highlights that 
neither of these provisions refer to any unlawful conduct but in contrast seem to deal 
with situations where the requisitions were in place. This would point to an early at-
tempt to restrain the enemy army’s possibility to freely ”live off the land” without com-
pensation.60 Even though the regulations are not considered as the letter of the law, the 
intent to address individuals can be detected from them, as they are a complementary 
part of the Convention.61  
 
ICJ Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Oc-
cupied Palestinian territory of 2004 however affirmed the duty of a state to provide 
restitution and compensation for individuals having suffered as a result of the construc-
tion of the wall.62 In the operative part of the Advisory Opinion, the Court held that Is-
rael had an obligation to provide reparation for all damage caused by the construction of 
the wall, as a result of the violations of international law.63 The Court identified the 
beneficiaries of the reparations as it held that Israel had the obligation to make repara-
tion for the damage caused “to all the natural and legal persons concerned”.64 Gaeta 
points out that the Court had admittedly not specified that the obligation for reparations 
specifically stemmed from the violations of the rules of IHL, the construction of the 
                                                
57 Kalshoven (1991) p. 830 (1991). See also; Zegveld, (2003) p. 506-507. 
58 Kalshoven (1991) p. 833.  
59 Regulations Respecting the Laws And Customs of War On Land #Section III: Art. 52 & 53.  
60 Kalshoven (1991) p. 830-831.  
61 Kalshoven (1991) p. 833.  
62 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, (The Wall) 
paras 145, 152–3. 
63 The Wall para 163, 3, C. Para 152.  
64 The Wall para 152.  
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wall being unlawful under various rules of international law.65 The failure of the Court 
to clarify the violations entailing the obligation would only mean that the Court found 
the matter irrelevant, since the obligation to repair follows naturally from the illegality 
of the Israeli conduct under the rules of international law, including specific rules of 
IHL.66 No basis for treaty claim can, however, be derived from the ruling of the Court 
as has been demonstrated by case law. In 2007 the ICJ Bosnia Genocide case provided 
significantly less clarity on state obligations to provide reparations when not according 
monetary compensation, based on the lack of a causal nexus between the failure by Ser-
bia to comply with its obligation to prevent genocide and the death of 7000 men in Sre-
brenica.67 The International Court of Justice has also taken the position that states, ra-
ther than individuals, are the beneficiaries of the provision and the ones having standing 
to lodge claims.68 This has been, according to Modirzahed, the approach also preferred 
by IHL lawyers69 and some national courts.70  The Court has been criticized for incon-
sistency in its jurisprudence and taking steps back due to the case.71 
 
A great portion of scholars, prefer the traditional reading of the Hague Convention of 
1907 and remain of the opinion that since the wording of the document does not address 
individuals, they in fact do not have direct claims against an enemy state. The relevant 
practice proving the contrary remains scarce.72 Reference to the open phrasing of Arti-
cle 3 of the Hague Convention IV and API article 91 has been made in order to justify 
interpreting the norm in light of recent developments in international law, especially the 
emergence of international human rights law and the growing recognition of the indi-
vidual as a subject of international law.73 The individualised reading of the provisions 
would according to this view, not represent an illegitimate development of the law 
crafted by judges, but would rather be considered a legitimate dynamic interpretation of 
the law.74 Dynamism in the interpretation of international law is a relevant but often 
contentious factor in international case law. Distinguishing between the letter of the law 
                                                
65 Gaeta (2011) in Ben-Naftali (eds.) p.321. According to the writer, the construction of the wall was in 
breach of in particular the law of self-determination of peoples, the rules on military occupation and hu-
man rights.  
66 See d’Argent (2006) p.436–477.  
67 Application of the Genocide Convention Case para. 462–470.  
68 Case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities para.26, Camins (2016) p. 130. 
69 Modirzadeh (2014) p. 225–304.  
70 Distomo case para. 20, discussed by Rau (2005) p. 702.  
71 See for example Gaeta (ed.) pp. 364–73 and Tomuschat (2007) p.905–912.  
72 Tomuschat (2014) p. 412. 
73 Rau (2005) p. 709, Peters (2016) p.203, 207. 
74 Peters (2014) p. 210.  
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(‘lex lata’) and the law that ought to be (‘lex ferenda’) is not simple since “there is al-
ways an international law in the process of formation.”75 
 
The humanitarian law treaties applicable in non-international armed conflicts are silent 
on reparation.76 According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), it 
lies in the nature of non-international armed conflicts that the approaches to reparations 
available in international armed conflicts are not automatically available in non-
international contexts, and that particularly in non-international armed conflicts the vic-
tims suffering in their own states usually have access to justice and a possibility to claim 
reparations through their domestic courts.77 The ICRC has however highlighted the 
growing amount of state practice showing that the rule to provide reparation for the loss 
or damage occurred would be considered a customary norm, therefore applying in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts.78  
 
Many arguments speaking for an emerging individual right to reparation under IHL rely 
on the fact that, although human rights and humanitarian law stem from different histor-
ical and doctrinal roots, their common denominator is the principle of humanity that is 
inherent to every individual. One should raise the question why the same individual can 
enforce his rights embedded in human rights treaties but not in humanitarian law trea-
ties. Though the arguments for the right of an individual to claim reparation exist and 
can be justified, the needed acknowledgements by relevant judicial authorities are still 
lacking in practice.  
 
Some progressive questions about a merger between IHL and IHRL have already been 
presented, which may have overread the current state of law. However, some interplay 
certainly has already occurred, concerning both international and non-international 
armed conflicts.79 Considering the nature of contemporary armed conflicts, the victims 
have sought alternative options in accessing reparations. Both Additional Protocols 
acknowledge the application of human rights in armed conflicts,80 and while the ICRC 
did not follow this course in the early stages of the discussion,81 it later accepted that 
                                                
75 Case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities (Dissenting opinion of Cancado Trindade), paras. 32, 39. 
referring to A. Alvarez (1962) p. 292.  
76 References to a right to reparation in the context of a non-international armed conflict can be found 
only in customary international law, see Henckaerts, J., et al. (2005) rule 150. 
77 Henckaerts, J., et al. (2005) rule 150.  
78 Henckaerts, J., et al. (2005) rule 150. 
79 See, Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom. Also see Kleffner (2002) p. 238. 
80 Article 72 of AP I Preamble of Protocol II  
81 ICRC (1973); see also (Pictet) p. 15. Assumedly there was also an institutional motivation for the ICRC 
to keep its distance from human rights, which were associated with the “ politicised ” organs of the Unit-
ed Nations. 
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“human rights continue to apply concurrently with IHL in time of armed conflict.”82 
The position that human rights do not generally cease to apply in armed conflicts is now 
broadly established and has been confirmed by the ICJ with respect to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)83 as well as by regional human rights 
instruments accordingly.84 The details of the interaction between the two bodies of law 
interaction remain under discussion.85 
2.3 Reparations in human rights law applicable in Africa 
Human rights instruments applicable in Africa contain references to reparations. Article 
2(3) of the ICCPR puts the states under an obligation to provide an effective remedy to 
any person whose rights have been violated.86 Furthermore, Article 2(1) of the Cove-
nant obliges the states parties “to respect and ensure to all individuals (…) the rights 
recognized (…) without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other sta-
tus.” The only reference to reparations (the word ‘compensation’) is found in articles 
9(5) and 14(6) in the contexts of unlawful arrest, detention and conviction.87 Though the 
ICCPR does not contain a general reparation clause, the Human Rights Committee has, 
relying on Article 2(3) recognized that this right entails a duty of the state to grant repa-
ration, in the forms of e.g. restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and satisfaction.88 
Recommendations based on article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR on awarding compensation as 
forms of reparations are also found in several concluding observations of the Commit-
tee.89  
 
Though the Human Rights Committee has in its General Comment No. 31 affirmed that 
reparation is a central part of an effective remedy, it has maintained a rather narrow in-
terpretation of article 2(3) in individual petitions, and has not developed remedies in 
                                                
82Sandoz et al. (1987). para. 4429. 
83 See i.e. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (The 
Wall) and  Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda.  
84 See ie. Al-Jedda v The United Kingdom (ECHR) 27021/08 (2011) and Abella v Argentina Case (IAm 
Comm of HR).  
85 Droege (2008) p.506.  
86 Articles 2(1) and 2(3) of the ICCPR.  
87 Articles 9(5) and 14(6) of the ICCPR.  
88 ICJ (2016) p.153–213. The case law of the Human Rights Committee confirms the arguments, most 
recently in Andrei Strizhak v Belarus, para. 8 where the Committee puts emphasis on the need to provide 
full reparations (italics added).  
89 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of discrimination against women: Liby-
an Arab Jamahiriya, para 7. See also Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: on Mex-
ico, UN para 6. and Guatemala, para 12. 
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line with the General Comment.90 The Concluding observations of the Committee have, 
however, provided a platform to pronounce on the positive obligation of the state en-
shrined in the ICCPR: under certain circumstances, i.e. disappearances, a failure to en-
sure Covenant rights such as required by Article 2 may result to violations by the state 
parties, as a result of a failure to take appropriate action or to exercise due diligence to 
prevent, punish investigate or redress the harm caused by private actors.91 
 
The Human Rights Committee has referred to reparations in the context of an armed 
conflict in several Concluding observations, and has interpreted remedies quite broadly. 
In its review of Bosnia and Hertzegovina, the Committee noted that the failure of the 
state to investigate the cause and circumstance of death and provide information on the 
burial of the victims may amount, among other provisions, to a violation of article 2(3). 
What was to be done according to the Committee was to “take immediate steps to inves-
tigate”. The Committee also requested the finalization of a missing person database, and 
a prompt commencement of payments to the families of the deceased.92 Not only did the 
Committee consider reparations to be awarded to the family members of the victims, it 
also required another measures to be commenced to prevent similar violations from 
happening and to better monitor the situation of missing persons in the state. The link 
between reparations and effective investigations was highlighted by the Committee also 
in i.e. on its Concluding observation on the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 
2006.93 The Committee’s observations on the Central African Republic also highlight 
the congruence of human rights law and humanitarian law. It notes the practical imple-
mentation of effective remedies awarded to the “victims of serious violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law”, “including the right to as full compensation 
and reparations as possible”.94 
 
Somewhat similarly to the ICCPR, the African Charter does not have an explicit article 
on the right to reparation.95 Article 7(1)(a) provides that everyone has the right to have 
his cause heard, including “a right to an appeal to competent national organ against acts 
of violating his fundamental rights as recognised and guaranteed by convictions, laws, 
regulations and customs in force.” However, the African Commission has interpreted 
                                                
90 See Evans (2012) on General Comment No. 31 p. 52.  
91 General Comment No. 31 of the Human Rights Committee, para. 8.  
92 Concluding Observations on Bosnia and Hertzegovina 2006, para. 14.  
93 Concluding Observations on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2006, para 16.  
94 Concluding Observations Central African Republic 2006, paras. 8, 10.  
95 The only reference to reparations relates to the plundering of natural resources in Article 21 of the 
Charter, where it states, “the disposed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its property as 
well as to adequate compensation.”  
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the protection awarded by Article 7(1) as wider than the explicit wording, pointing to-
wards reparations, by stating that 
 
“The protection afforded by Article 7 is not limited to the protection of the rights of arrested and 
detained persons but encompasses the rights of every individual to access the relevant judicial 
bodies competent to have their causes heard and be granted adequate relief.”96  
 
Other cases could also be seen as evidence of the African Commission’s willingness to 
read the African Charter as a document providing for the right to reparation. In Embga 
Mekongo v Cameroon, the victim was entitled to reparations, the value of which was 
however to be determined in accordance with the Cameroonian legislation.97 In Malawi 
African Association & Others v Mauritania, the African Commission ordered the Mau-
ritanian government to e.g. pay compensatory benefits to the dependents of the vic-
tims.98 According to Sarkin, this, in addition to the other existing human rights instru-
ments and international law on state responsibility, presents a well-established legal 
basis for reparations for victims of human rights and humanitarian abuses in Africa.99 
As the African Commission has noted in its General Comment No. 4, the right to re-
dress encompasses “the right to an effective remedy and to adequate, effective and 
comprehensive reparation”.100  
 
Musila presents as a possibility that the drafters of the African Charter could have con-
sidered it superfluous to include a right that would be seen as an implied, self-evident 
right, reflecting the principle ubi jus ibi remedium: for the violation of every right, there 
must be a remedy.101 The challenging political realities prevailing at the time of the 
Charter’s adoption have also been presented as a reason for the ‘omission’.102 Musila 
however supports the arguments criticizing the jurisprudence of the African Commis-
sion for ‘situational’ interpretations and the lack of theorisation103, as well as the lack of 
                                                
96 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, para.213. 
97 Embga Mekongo v. Cameroon, Findings and recommendations.   
98 Malawi African Association & Others v Mauritania, Findings and recommendations.   
99 Sarkin (2014) p.539. In his article, Sarkin argues for the right to reparation to exist specifically in the 
Ugandan context.  
100 General Comment of the ACHPR, No. 4, (2017). 
101 Musila (2006) p.447.  
102 See generally Heyns (2002) ‘Civil and political rights in the African Charter’ in M Evans & R Murray 
(eds.) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The system in practice, 1986-2000 (2002). 
103 The African Commission has according to Musila (2006 p.459) elaborated the general state obligations 
under the African Charter as entailing the duties to respect, protect, promote and fulfil, it has not offered 
much jurisprudential guidance to states on the question of how to supply redress.  
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connections104 between the Charter and norms on the international level,105 creating 
ambiguity on the victim’s position in terms of reparation claims.  
 
From another point of view, the lack of willingness from the African Commission’s side 
to address reparations for a long time, and the continuous vagueness of its reasonings, 
speaks for a contrary, or at least a slightly different argument to Musila’s.106 According 
to Ssenyonjo, the African Commission for several years, instead or ordering specific 
actions to be taken by the states, intentionally promoted a ’positive dialogue’, leading to 
fairly conciliatory resolutions.107 This is demonstrated by cases such as RADDHO v 
Zambia,108 where the African Commission decided not to afford victims an adequate 
remedy, but to “continue efforts to pursue an amicable resolution.”109 Ssenyonjo how-
ever concludes that the African Commission has over the years made, despite the lack 
of an express mandate, significant improvements in efforts to award remedies to victims 
of human rights violations. Even in the absence of a consistent approach, it has made 
some notable non-monetary recommendations.110 It has also acknowledged the signifi-
cance of monetary awards, in the form of ’just and adequate’ or ’fair and equitable’ 
compensation, to victims of human rights violations against several states, providing a 
basis to develop a more consistent approach.111 In the absence of proof of what the in-
tentions of the drafters of the Charter were, it could be reasonable to assume that what 
was too difficult to agree on at the time of the drafting, was intentionally left out.  The 
inconsistency of the jurisprudence and the lack of reference to reparation-related in-
struments in cases provide additional evidence, pointing towards the difficulty of cir-
cumstances during the time of drafting, as well as in the 2000’s and 2010’s. The fact 
that the African Commission for a long time utilized an approach promoting dialogue 
                                                
104 See Jawara para.33-34. The Commission simply pronounced that the local rules must be applied in 
alignment with article 7.  Musila (2006 p.459) states that the Commission has not, in any of its decisions 
or elsewhere, clarified the broad principles or what specific remedies would be applicable generally under 
the Charter. Where reference has been made to international law, this has mostly been general, as in Am-
nesty International and Others v Sudan.  
105 Musila, (2006), p. 442, 444, 459.  
106 Ssenyonjo (2018) p.12.  
107 Ssenyonjo (2018) p.12.  
108 See Senyonjo (2018) comment on RADDHO v Zambia, p. 13.  
109 RADDHO v Zambia, Holding 
110 Ssenyonjo (2018) p. 12 and 14. The Commission has made recommendations such as that complain-
ants under detention should be released (See e.g. Centre for Free Speech v Nigeria, Constitutional Rights 
Project v Nigeria, (the Commission urged Nigeria to release 11 soldiers of the Nigerian army found inno-
cent) and afforded a fair trial including access to family and legal representatives, no name some. See. 
Article 19 v Eritrea. 
111 Ssenyonjo (2018) p. 15-17, referring to countries such as Benin (see Odjouoriby Cossi Paul v Benin), 
Congo (Antoine Bissangou v Republic of Congo), DRC (Marcel Wetsh’okonda Koso and others v Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo), Kenya (Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya)) and Minority 
Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya), and Sudan (Sudan Human 
Rights Organisation v Sudan).  
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and avoiding the topic of reparations could be seen as a continuum for the situation at 
the time of drafting: in volatile circumstances the African Commission might have kept 
the strategy of still not pronouncing on topics too controversial. This would, however, 
not point towards an intention to rule out the possibility of reparations.  
 
While the African Commission for a long time struggled with pronouncing on repara-
tions, the Human Rights Committee has also not succeeded in consistency. As a most 
consistent element in the Committee’s jurisprudence, it has required the state party to 
publish the view of the Committee when violations have been found.112 It has also from 
time to time used terms such as ‘full reparation’ or ‘adequate reparation’, yet without 
great coherence.113 As the Committee lacks the mandate to order financial awards in 
individual cases, it has approached reparations more broadly. Its orders have also in 
individual petitions considered practical action, relating to i.e. providing information, or 
‘compensation’ for the anguish suffered by the families of the victims.114 Whereas the 
African Commission took its time to get to a point where it considered necessary to start 
pronouncing on reparations, the approach of the Human Rights Committee, though 
clearly established in its General Comment, has not greatly contributed to the actual 
realisation of reparations for victims either.  
 
A fairly little attention has focused on an African instrument particularly pronouncing 
on women’s rights in an armed conflict. The Maputo Protocol115 requires states to “pro-
vide for appropriate remedies to any woman whose rights or freedoms . . . have been 
violated”, departing from the approach of the African Charter by clearly pronouncing on 
reparations.116 Article 4(f) obliges the states that have ratified the Protocol to “establish 
mechanisms and accessible services for effective information, rehabilitation and repara-
tion for victims of violence against women.”117 Article the 11 of Maputo Protocol par-
ticularly addresses the protection of civilians, including women, and calls for the states 
parties to the Protocol to “undertake to protect “…” against all forms of violence, rape 
and other forms of sexual exploitation, … “ in armed conflicts.118 Article 11(2) of the 
                                                
112 Kurbonov v. Tajikistan, Final Views, para. 9; Medjnoune v. Algeria, No. Final Views, para. 11; Mu-
lezi v. Democratic Republic of Congo, Final Views, para. 8 as noted by Evans (2012) p. 47.  
113 Evans (2012) p.47. 
114 Sankara v. Burkina Faso, Final Views, para. 14. 
115 The Maputo protocol has been ratified by 36 of 54 African Union member nations. See Maputo Proto-
col website, accessed 26 July 2019. 
116 Maputo Protocol, Art. 25(a) 
117 Maputo Protocol, Art. 4(f). The mechanism of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in 
Africa was created by the Commission in 1999 to ‘serve as a focal point for the promotion and protection 
of the rights of women in Africa amongst the 11 members of the African Commission’, assumedly based 
on the article 4(f) obligation. See the website of the African Commission (2019) 
118 Maputo Protocol Art. 11(3).  
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Protocol refers to the state obligation to act “in accordance with the obligations incum-
bent upon them under international humanitarian law” to protect civilians.119 The in-
strument directly refers to IHL in certain provisions, which may be the reason the times 
they have been applied have been so few.  
 
The African Court has an express mandate to award reparation, by making “appropriate 
orders to remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation or repara-
tion.”120 As of today, only nine121 of the 30 states parties122 to the Protocol have made 
the declaration to recognize the competence of the Court to receive cases from NGOs 
and individuals. The referral of cases to the African Court when necessary, for instance 
in situations dealing with grave violations of human rights, or when a state has not 
complied with its resolution, would be another way of strengthening and clarifying vic-
tims’ rights.123 Being at a very early stages of its operations, not a lot can be said about 
its effectiveness in terms of reparations. Though the Protocol changes the situation nor-
matively by expressly providing for certain forms of remedies,124 reaching a greater 
level of clarity will take time. Even in the absence of a consistent approach with repara-
tions, the creation of a clear mandate for the African Court, in addition to the African 
Commission’s growing amount of reparation recommendations, speaks for a willing-
ness to strengthen the position of an individual as a receiver of reparations on the conti-
nent.   
 
To conclude, as a larger, favourable context for the existence of a right to reparation 
within the African regional system, Evans highlights the African Commission’s inter-
pretation of Article 55 of the Charter. The non-existence of a reparations provision has, 
according to Evans, permitted NGOs, both national and international, to lodge cases to 
the African Commission, allowing for the review of cases relating to large-scale human 
rights abuses. This has been possible since the Commission has interpreted the provi-
sion in article 55 on “communications other than those of States parties” to refer to the 
possibility of receiving claims from NGOs and individuals as well.125 At least 14 coun-
                                                
119 Maputo Protocol Art. 11(2).  
120 Protocol to the African Charter On Human and Peoples` Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples` Rights, Article 27(1) 
121 Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Tanzania and Rep. of Tunisia. 
122 Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Comoros, Congo, Gabon, The 
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123 Redress Report (2016) p. 19-20.  
124 Musila (2006) p.464.  
125 Evans (2012) p. 76 referring to Umozurike (2001) The Complaint Procedures of the African Commis-
sion on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, in Alfredsson, Grimheden, Ramcharan and de Zayas (eds), pp. 713–
30; Viljoen,(2002) Admissibility under the African Charter’, in Evans and Murray (eds), pp. 61–99. 
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tries in Africa have prescribed reparation initiatives.126 While this indicates and rein-
forces the acceptance of the imperative of reparation, the design and implementation of 
reparation regimes has often been fraught with challenges. At least partially due to this, 
multiple African countries, such as Rwanda, Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique 
have drawn use of local or indigenous justice mechanisms, instead of or in addition to 
the courts, that often times had mandates concerning reparative measures. While the 
lack of a reparations clause may even out the road for cases of a larger scale, the initial 
problem, especially relevant to the victims of armed conflicts still stands. When viola-
tions are large scale, the need for resources enabling the enforcement of reparations is 
just as large.  
                                                
126 Algeria, Uganda, Sudan, South Africa, Rwanda, Nigeria, Liberia, Kenya, Ghana, Ethiopia, DRC, 
Chad, Tunisia, Morocco and Sierra Leone. 
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3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IHL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 
3.1 The application of human rights law in armed conflicts 
While international humanitarian law itself does not provide an individual with a clear 
and direct lane through which seek reparations for violations during an armed conflict, 
human rights bodies, offering an individual possibilities to seek remedy, may be helpful 
in addressing events that constitute violations of IHL, but are also breaches of human 
rights law. As both the African Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights contain provisions that have been interpreted as providing for the right 
to reparation, the individual has an actual remedy. The issue and uncertainty of the out-
come, however, lies in the applicability of human rights law in armed conflicts, and the 
way in which human rights bodies are interpreting the relationship between IHL and 
human rights law.  
 
Identifying conflict-related gender-based violence is not necessarily straightforward 
since violence of such nature takes place also in the absence of conflicts. Making the 
connection between individual gender-based violations and conflict-related violence 
such as the use of rape as a systematic tool of warfare requires substantially more evi-
dence than identifying individual crimes. Since proving the systematic nature of this 
form of gendered violence is often difficult, the victims may reach justice more effec-
tively if the connection of the violations to the hostilities is not established. Since other 
type of violence towards the civilian population also often affects women dispropor-
tionately, multiple violations towards civilians may possibly also be violations of gen-
dered nature. The gendered nature of these type of offences, when it exists, may also 
remain hidden. The manner in which the human rights treaty bodies have connected the 
violations to the prevailing conflict and therefore affirmed the applicability of IHL af-
fect the individual.   
 
Chapters 3.2 and 3.3 address the issue of the relationship between IHL and human 
rights law and seek to identify the ways in which the Human Rights Committee and the 
African human rights bodies have applied IHL in situations of armed conflicts. Though 
that was not necessarily meant to take place, ways to harmonize their co-existence and 
application must be sought for.127 In situations where there is overlap between IHL and 
                                                
127 Droege (2008) p. 501-502. 
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IHRL, their relationship has in general been interpreted through the concept of comple-
mentarity and the principle of lex specialis.128  
3.2 Complementarity of IHL and human rights law 
Complementarity means that human rights law and humanitarian law, being based on 
the same principles and values, can influence and reinforce each other, while not con-
tradicting each other.129 According to Iguyovwe, human rights law, being broader in its 
scope of application, can sometimes benefit from the more narrowly applicable rules of 
IHL. On the other hand, the increasingly specific body of jurisprudence of human rights 
law can influence IHL that has less interpretative jurisprudence at hand.130 The jurispru-
dence on reparations created by human rights bodies serves as an example.  
 
Complementarity reflects the method of interpretation enshrined in Article 31(3)(c) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which when a norm is in-
terpreted, ”any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties” shall be taken into account. It has been suggested that this principle, also re-
ferred to as the principle of systemic integration, enshrines the idea of understanding 
international law as a comprehensive and coherent system, where different sets of 
norms co-exist in harmony, without controversy.131 This would reinforce the possibility 
of interpreting IHL in the light of human rights and the opposite way around.132  
 
In many cases IHL and human rights law do not contradict each other, but rather regu-
late different aspects of a situation, or in a mutually reinforcing way, provide regula-
tions for it in more or less detail. There are, however, limits on the areas of mutual rein-
forcement, one of which being the right to remedy and reparation.133 All major human 
rights instruments have a form of individual mechanism for receiving complaints, but 
humanitarian law does not directly provide such a channel, as established in the previ-
ous chapter. Droege, however, points out that the increasing awareness of the applica-
tion of human rights in armed conflicts as well as an increasing call for transparency 
and accountability in military operations can potentially have an impact on the way cer-
tain rights under IHL are understood, reflecting the principle of complementarity.134 For 
                                                
128 Iguyovwe (2008) p. 779.  
129 Iguyovwe (2008) p. 779.  
130 Droege (2007) p.341.  
131 McLachlan (2005) p.279–320.  
132 Droege (2008) p. 521.  
133 Iguyovwe (2008) p. 781.  
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an individual, this would possibly mean greater coherence and less friction in the rights 
granted to them by the two bodies of law. It seems clear that the provisions in human 
rights law granting the individual a right to reparations may complement the IHL re-
gime applicable during armed conflicts. Complementarity does not, however, clearly 
provide a solution to situations where these two regimes seemingly contradict each oth-
er, and in that way, affect the rights of an individual.  
3.3 Lex specialis 
Another principle of interpretation can be detected from international jurisprudence. 
According to Hathaway et al, it is useful to distinguish between three different ap-
proaches to the applicability of human rights law in armed conflicts: one in which inter-
national humanitarian law prevails in cases of conflicts between the two bodies of law; 
another in which human rights prevail; and, finally, one in which the more specific law 
in the particular context and question at hand applies, the lex specialis principle.135 The 
principle has been used by the ICJ in its advisory opinions on the Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons case136 and the Wall case137 and reiterated in the DRC v 
Uganda case138, to illustrate the relationship between the two bodies of law. The ICJ 
pronouncements on this principle do provide significant interpretative tools and guide-
lines in the relatively blank starting position, but there is a large amount of academic 
writings proposing that the pronouncements in fact bring up additional questions and 
are not practically helpful when applying the law in cases of dealing with the relation-
ship between human rights law and IHL,139 especially when breaking it down to a level 
of an individual. Whether lex specialis only means that the special provision prevails 
over the general, or that the former actually displaces the latter, is not clear.140 Whether 
an individual has suffered a breach of his or her rights granted by human rights instru-
ments during an armed conflict, is suddenly a less straightforward question. 
 
Hampson makes three different propositions for the interpretation of lex specialis. It 
seems that what the ICJ had first meant, was that where both IHL and human rights law 
are applicable, priority should be given to IHL. She suggests that the ICJ meant for 
the human rights body to make a finding based on IHL, while expressing it in the lan-
                                                
135 See Hathaway, Crootof ,Levitz, Nix & Perdue (2011)  
136 Legality or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory, para. 25 
137 The Wall, para. 106. 
138 Case concerning armed activity on the territory of the Congo, paras. 216–220. 
139 Hampson (2008) p.551.  
140 Hampson (2008) p. 558.  
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guage of human rights law.141 This interpretation, however, does not provide practical 
guidance on the application of the principle.142 An alternative would be to assume that 
IHL prevails where it contains an express provision addressing a similar field to that of 
a human rights provision. The problem with this interpretation is that while IHL affects 
some human rights law rules significantly, it leaves some provisions almost totally unaf-
fected. The question would then be to what extent the conflict context would affect the 
applicability of human rights law, when there is no express provision. Human rights 
treaty bodies would in this case have quite a lot of freedom in applying the limitation 
clauses many human rights provisions contain. The role of customary law is unclear in 
this situation, and the lack of treaty provisions applicable to non-international armed 
conflicts would in some cases lead to irrational outcomes.143 Yet another option would 
be to interpret lex specialis according to the issue at hand. In that case, where IHL pro-
vides a provision regarding a situation, such as a fair trial, but does not further specify 
that, human rights law would be applicable, and would address the aspects of the right 
not covered by IHL. An obvious issue to this interpretation is the question, whether only 
treaty provisions determine the content of human rights law, or would other pro-
nouncements, such as the concluding observations of treaty bodies and their General 
Comments, have a place in specifying the IHL norm in question. 144 Assuming that the 
relationship will be formulated by means of litigation seems an arbitrary method, since 
it is not exclusively an inter-state affair but also an affair of the state and those within its 
jurisdiction.145  
 
Though stemming from the idea of complementarity, the principle of systemic integra-
tion has also been discussed in relation to lex specialis. It has been suggested that the 
ICJ, in the case Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, in fact did not resort 
to lex specialis. Since it does not as a matter of fact set aside human rights law, it could 
be said to have rather applied the VCLT article 31(3)(c) in considering all the interna-
tional rules that might be relevant to the interpretation of a certain norm, and in this way 
                                                
141 See Hampson (2008) p. 559 on the Legality or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, para. 25; the Wall 
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142 See Arnold, Roberta – Quénivet, Noëlle (eds.) International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
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applying the principle of systemic integration.146 According to Todeschini, the ICJ uses 
IHL to give meaning to the convention article in question.147 Many human rights bodies, 
including the Human Rights Committee, have frequently employed the principle.148  
 
Out of the three lex specialis interpretations, Hampson proposes the second alternative 
could be the best compromise, but emphasises the need for agreement between the 
states and the human rights bodies on which way to go about the problem.149 The first 
option suggested by Hampson, giving priority to IHL, could also in principle work as a 
simple solution. Human rights bodies would therefore need to thoroughly investigate 
the areas of horizontal overlap between the human rights norms and IHL. The issue re-
garding non-international armed conflicts would be one of the most urgent ones to re-
solve. It is suggested that the solution to lex specialis issue should be one that has the 
ability to be applied at the moment of decision by those responsible for it, or it should 
be abandoned altogether.150 Interpreting the relationships according to the issue at hand, 
regardless of the fact that it would require the human rights bodies to develop a solid 
jurisprudence on the matter, would be a starting point for moving forward in the matter. 
Even though litigation is slow, the most frequent questions brought in front of the hu-
man rights bodies would slowly start being addressed, and the paralysis caused by ina-
bility to find a perfect solution would be avoided.  
 
In practical terms, the extent to which it is possible for human rights bodies to take other 
international law into account, depends on whether the human rights treaties in question 
include derogation clauses or whether they refer to other sources of international law.151 
As covered, even in the absence of a reference to other international treaties, article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention plays a role.152 The jurisprudence of the Human 
rights Committee and the African Commission and the Court will be addressed through 
these three lenses. The interpretations of treaty bodies have been divided into three cat-
egories; derogation clauses, references to other sources of international law, and specific 
references to article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention.  
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3.4 Human rights bodies addressing the relationship between IHL 
and international human rights law  
3.4.1 Derogation clauses 
Whether an individual has access to reparations based on human rights violations natu-
rally depends on whether certain violations can be read into violations of human rights, 
or violations at all under the circumstances. Derogations from human rights obligations 
enshrined in treaties are permissible only to the extent to which they are inevitably re-
quired based on the situation and do not in any other way conflict with the state’s other 
international obligations. They are also only acceptable when they do not involve dis-
crimination solely on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social 
origin.153 Bearing this in mind that gender-based violence, often taking the form of dis-
crimination, is unlikely to be considered a norm from which derogations are allowed.  
 
To set the stage for other forms of interpreting the relationship between IHL and human 
rights law during armed conflicts, a brief review of derogations is however in place. In 
general, derogations lead to occasions where human rights law and IHL interact, and the 
positions taken by the human rights bodies may assist in interpreting the relationship 
between the bodies of law in general. The ICCPR allows for derogations when it comes 
to certain rights in times of public emergency, while some rights, e.g. article 6, the right 
to life, are not subject to derogations under any conditions. Article 14 of the ICCPR, the 
article referring to compensation, is not among the non-derogable articles listed in arti-
cle 4. The African Charter does not in general allow derogations, based on which the 
Commission has deduced that the rights enshrined in the Charter remain operational 
during armed conflict.154 A number of cases have given the African Commission a 
chance to conclude and affirm that the states are never allowed to derogate from their 
human rights obligations.155  
 
Since the ICCPR prohibits e.g. arbitrary killings but does not define ‘arbitrary’, the 
meaning of the word could be affected by the existence of an armed conflict, even when 
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there is no possibility to derogate. The Human Rights Committee could, according to 
Hampson, still use IHL to determine whether there was a violation of human rights law, 
without the question of derogation.156 Practically, and similarly to the ICCPR, the Char-
ter does not e.g. in Article 4 provide a definition for what constitutes ‘arbitrary’ when it 
comes to the deprivation of life.157 General Comment No. 3 of the African Commission 
on the Right to Life, however provides the scope of the prohibition on the ‘arbitrary’ 
deprivation of life and specifically refers to armed conflicts by stating that during those 
times the right to life needs to be interpreted with regard to the rules of IHL.158 Even 
without officially allowing for derogations, the African Charter does allow room for 
interpretation. When it comes to arbitrary deprivation of life, gendered violence, e.g. 
violence towards women usually takes the form of civilian casualties. When IHL rules 
for targeting are followed and the military activity leads to civilian victims, it could be 
assumed that no violation has occurred.  
 
Considering derogations as a factor related to a right to reparation is relevant due to the 
differing regimes in IACs and NIACs. IHL regulates international armed conflicts 
(IAC) differently to non-international armed conflicts (NIAC), which may in practice 
result in different levels of protection to an individual in cases where derogations invite 
interpretations from the IHL regime that currently stands. The Human Rights Commit-
tee addressed Article 6 of the ICCPR in its General Comment No. 36 in situations of 
armed conflict, in a rather general and unsatisfactory way. Todeschini however men-
tions that the Committee’s reluctance or failure to distinguish between IACs and NIACs 
in General Comment No. 36 did not in this case create too much confusion. Since the 
IAC rules governing targeting, namely the principles of distinction, proportionality and 
precaution, while namely applying in IACs have attained a customary status and there-
fore apply in NIACs as well, the situation from the point of view of an individual would 
not be substantially different.159 Violations of gendered nature would typically fall into 
a category of violations that would in this case not be affected by the characterization of 
the conflict. More important would be identifying the conflict nexus of the violations.  
 
The use of force against a person could either relate to the armed conflict, or, in the ab-
sence of a nexus to it, be governed under the paradigm of law enforcement. The fact that 
human rights law continues to govern law enforcement, even when a conflict occurs, is 
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relevant especially when it comes to low intensity NIACs and NIACs taking place only 
in certain parts of the territory of a state.160 According to Todeschini, General Comment 
No. 36 does not succeed in separating these two paradigms; in fact by failing to differ-
entiate the paradigms of law enforcement and the conduct of hostilities, it risks giving 
states more leeway in using lethal force according to IHL rules, while law enforcement 
paradigm should be the one applicable.161 In this case, the rights of an individual suffer-
ing any kind of violence are at stake, if NIAC rules are applied when no real connection 
to the armed conflict exists. This violence can most often disproportionately affect 
women and children. In terms of reparation clauses, the law enforcement paradigm 
gives an individual a more uncomplicated channel to reparations, since human rights 
law provisions are at place without IHL influence.  
 
In General Comment No. 29 the Human Rights Committee stated that even rights that 
are potentially derogable have a non-derogable core.162 According to Hampson, this 
would likely mean that human rights bodies would treat rights with a close relationship 
to a non-derogable norm in fact also non-derogable. Todeschini presents the same ar-
gument by highlighting General Comment No. 29 as remarkable since the Human 
Rights Committee makes a pronouncement on IHL’s role in helping to prevent the 
abuse of a state’s emergency powers regarding derogations, acting as an outer bounda-
ry.163 Additionally, the Committee used IHL to limit the states’ abilities to derogate 
from certain ICCPR provisions164, which are not listed as non-derogable norms in the 
convention per se.165 The Committee seemed to rely on the fact that IHL recognises fair 
trial rights in armed conflicts166 and maintained that states are not to derogate from the 
‘constitutive elements’ of this right even in other situations of emergency.167 Todeschini 
refers to this as IHL providing and additional layer of protection of certain human 
rights.168 Article 14 of the ICCPR enshrines similar rights granted to the individual, i.e. 
14(1) equality before the courts and tribunals and 14(2) the right to be presumed inno-
cent until proven guilty. Leaning on this interpretation, it would seem unlikely that the 
Human Rights Committee would due to the lack of a an explicit right to reparation in 
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IHL, limit the rights enshrined in article 14, when it has previously used IHL to protect 
the individual.  
 
Though the interpretive effect of IHL on human rights in derogations during different 
types of conflicts does not necessarily differ, the protective impact of IHL is not similar 
without exception when it comes to conflicts of different nature. The Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comment No. 35 has sparked conversation since its approach 
there can be seen as one implicitly differentiating between international and non-
international armed conflicts regarding detention: a measure not directly regulated in 
non-international armed conflicts. The Committee in General Comment No. 35 states 
that  
 
“During international armed conflict, substantive and procedural rules of international humani-
tarian law remain applicable and limit the ability to derogate, thereby helping to mitigate the 
risk of arbitrary detention.”169 
 
which has been suggested to infer that the issue under consideration only relates to in-
ternational armed conflicts.170 Todeschini, however, challenges the argument by saying 
that the reference to IHL as a limit to derogation powers should be read while also con-
sidering General Comment No. 29, where the Committee has supposedly not made a 
distinction. The emphasis on the convergent relationship between IHL and the ICCPR 
should be seen as indicators of their complementary relationship, and the pronounce-
ments not as differentiating conflicts specifically.171 Todeschini does note that the ques-
tion of the regulation of internment in non-international armed conflicts remains un-
clear, as it is not clearly settled whether IHL expressly regulates internment in them.172  
 
Hampson highlights that human rights bodies have been applying human rights law in 
cases of killings during NIACs in several cases where the existence of an international 
armed conflict has not been acknowledged, and have not received criticism for it.173 
Human rights bodies have even used human rights law in its entirety in cases of non-
international armed conflict, when there have been no derogations.174 Detecting the im-
pact of the cases considering derogations on reparation provisions in human rights in-
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struments has not properly been touched upon. However, considering the Human Rights 
Committee’s approach to limit the possibility to derogate on certain norms would point 
towards a strengthened position for the individual; considering Hampson’s take, espe-
cially in non-international armed conflicts.  
3.4.2 References to other sources of international law 
Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter explicitly allow the African Commission to 
have regard to other sources of international law, more specifically to ‘draw inspiration 
from international law on human and peoples’ rights’175 and “take into consideration, as 
subsidiary measures (…) consistent with international norms on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, customs generally accepted as law, general principles of law recognised by Af-
rican States as well as legal precedents and doctrine.”176 In Amnesty International, while 
not finding a violation directly in terms of humanitarian law, the African Commission 
used IHL language when it identified a violation of the right to life under the African 
Charter in the killing of ’unarmed civilians’.177 The African Commission’s approach in 
the case is part of the reason why it has sometimes been detected having a human 
rights-based approach. Amnesty International as well as Chad Mass Violations dealt 
with situations of civil war and, hence, non-international rather than international armed 
conflicts, where humanitarian law is least worked out as a matter of law. While serious 
violations of human rights were found to have taken place during the armed conflict in 
Chad, the African Commission was silent on the states responsibility to provide repara-
tion measures.178 The contribution of the case has, according to Evans, been the affirma-
tion of the positive duty of the state to prevent violations by non-state actors,179 being 
consistent with other international treaty bodies and regional human rights systems180 
and furthermore strengthening the position of an individual victim in a NIAC. The Afri-
can Commission has multiple times also emphasised e.g. that the successor govern-
ments inherit the previous government’s obligations, “including the responsibility for 
the previous government’s mismanagement.”181  
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The Human Rights Committee has generally avoided the use of the lex specialis formu-
lation and has instead found that “both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually 
exclusive”.182 According to Todeschini, the Human Rights Committee has in its General 
Comment No. 31 taken a complementary approach, considering IHL and human rights 
law as mutually reinforcing bodies of law.183 The Committee there rejects the idea that 
the applicability of IHL excludes the concurrent applicability of human rights law but 
fails to explain how the complementarity approach would work in practice.184 Conclud-
ing observations of the Committee also support the interpretation that the convergence 
of IHL and human rights law is acknowledged in protecting certain rights,185 as dis-
cussed in 3.1. Complementary approach has been affirmed also in General Comment 
No. 35.186 No specific examples of the effect of IHL norms on the reparation provision 
in human rights law emerge from the Human Rights Committee’s jurisprudence and 
highlighting the complementarity approach is not bringing new clarity on the issue. 
Since complementary has been acknowledged with an aim to protect rights, one could 
assume the references to complementarity in the Human Rights Committee’s jurispru-
dence would at least not seek to weaken the reparatory dimension of human rights law.  
 
As another way of referring to other sources of international law, the African Commis-
sion has in some cases sought ‘interpretative guidance’ from IHL, though only finding 
violations of human rights law.187 Concerning the question of occupation and its effects 
on the rights of the civilian population in the DRC case, the African Commission en-
gaged more explicitly with IHL, while only finding violations of the African Charter as 
such. It did acknowledge that the alleged violations by the armed forces fell “within the 
province of humanitarian law”, holding that the events were covered by the Geneva 
Convention and their Additional Protocols.188 The Commission was therefore most like-
ly again drawing inspiration from these “general principles of law recognized by Afri-
can states” by the virtue of articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter.189 Alternatively, if 
the Commission intended to incorporate IHL within a Charter right, a much more de-
tailed legal analysis on the rights would have been expected.190 The African Commis-
sion has, to some extent similarly to the Human Rights Committee, in its General 
Comment No. 3 highlighted the conflict nexus of the use of force and stated that  
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“International humanitarian law on the conduct of hostilities must only be applied during an armed con-
flict and where the use of force is part of the armed conflict. In all other situations of violence, including 
internal disturbances, tensions or riots, international human rights rules governing law enforcement opera-
tions apply”.191 
 
Whereas the approach of the Human Rights Committee was criticized for its inability to 
distinguish between the paradigms of law enforcement and the conduct of hostilities, the 
African Commission is here clearly, though not with abundant wording, making the 
distinction. Whether the General Comment No. 3 would actually mean the African 
Commission would consider it possible to read IHL into human rights, or only continue 
to draw inspiration from general principles of law by the virtue of article 60 and 61, is 
not completely clear only based on this.  
 
Although articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter are often cited together,192 they refer 
to different sources of international law and different ’methods’ of allowing the influ-
ence of other sources of international law to affect the interpretation of the Charter. 
Viljoen points out that a distinction should be made between the two provisions. A strict 
interpretation of article 60 would exclude international humanitarian law thereto, based 
on which it could be assumed that the African Commission finds its mandate to rely on 
humanitarian law treaties in article 61. The sources of international law where the com-
mission finds the referred IHL treaties are ‘other general or specialised international 
conventions laying down rules expressly recognised’ by AU member states and “other 
conventions”, referring to treaties that do not deal with human rights.193 The Geneva 
Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto are in the situation referred to by the 
Commission as ‘special international conventions’.194 Viljoen suggests that, although 
the Commission did not explicitly use the term at this point, it in fact categorises the 
treaties as lex specialis. The fact that the Commission did not consider the issue of 
whether the relevant treaties are expressly recognised by African states (as presented in 
article 61 as the second source to take into consideration), and also did not strive to clar-
ify how and why they have gained recognition as ’general principles’ is possibly ex-
plained by the prevailing situation that a majority of African states, with the exception 
of Eritrea, Angola and Somalia, are all parties to the Geneva Conventions and their Ad-
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ditional Protocols.195 Ratification of the Convention is however, not a prerequisite for 
interpretative recourse196 since some humanitarian law standards could be considered to 
have acquired a customary law status.197 According Hailbronner, both the African 
Commission and the African Court are just now starting to address questions on the 
application of humanitarian law, due to which their articulations on the relationship of-
ten raise a multitude of questions. She does however suggest that due to the compara-
tively broad formulation of rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Charter), an interpretive approach that reads international humanitarian law 
into human rights law could be both ‘feasible and convincing’.198  
 
Evidence of this can be detected in one of the most recent cases dealing with an armed 
conflict, Thomas Kwoyelo v. Uganda.199 In the case, the African Commission took a 
step towards what Viljoen had suggested, and now explicitly referred to lex specialis as 
a principle in an event of tension between IHL and the human rights provisions in the 
African Charter.200 Accordingly, for the particular case the African Commission applies 
the standard of treatment specified in Common Article 3, which is generally considered 
to have achieved a status of customary international law, referring to the principle of lex 
specialis as the norm giving the most detailed guidance priority.201 Furthermore, it goes 
on to affirm that acts taking place outside the conduct of hostilities are to be regulated 
by reference to human rights law.202 On the basis of articles 60 and 61 of the African 
Charter, in making reference to IHL rules, the African Commission accordingly said it 
uses, instead of the Charter standards that apply in normal conditions and peace times, 
the standards of the IHL rules for making a determination of the existence of violations 
of the provisions of the African Charter in such situations of NIACs.203 This was a posi-
tion previously stated in General Comment No.3.204 The expression ‘giving the most 
detailed guidance priority’ does not yet shed light on the question, what happens in a 
situation where IHL is silent. The Commission did refer to lex specialis as applicable in 
situations of ‘tension’ arising from the concurrent application of the bodies of law.205 
Where IHL is silent, no tension arises, and the Charter provisions on reparations can be 
applied without IHL influence. 
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Thomas Kwoyelo v. Uganda illustrates this, since the Commission found violations of 
the rights under articles 3 and 7(1)(a), and a partial violation under article 7(1)(d) of the 
African Charter, and ordered the Government of Uganda to pay adequate compensation 
to the victim, stating that the mode of payment of compensation should be guided by 
international norms and practices relating to payment of compensatory damages.206 
Both of articles 3 and 7(1)(d) were considered to be violations on their own, not by ref-
erence to IHL rules. This statement goes hand in hand with the Commission’s General 
Comment 3, where it highlights the conflict nexus as a benchmark in determining 
whether it is IHL or human rights law that governs the use of force against individu-
als.207 The African Commission here succeeds in addressing an issue that e.g. the Hu-
man Rights Commission in General Comment No. 36 did not, as stated, satisfyingly 
touch upon. The reason based on which the African Commission yet again refers to both 
articles is not clarified. Since it now expressly refers to lex specialis, it could be as-
sumed that reference to article 60 is, in alignment with Viljoen, done either because it 
does consider IHL conventions ‘instruments on human and people’s rights’, or due to 
the large numbers of state parties to the treaties on the continent acknowledging the 
standards.  
 
The African Commission has been blunt to articulate that it will only make findings of 
violations of the African Charter.208 The human rights based approach often taken by 
human rights bodies is particularly well understood in non-international armed conflicts, 
where the IHL provisions are not abundant. The African Commission is not facing an 
easy task when pursuing to use, instead of Charter standards, the standards of IHL in 
situations of NIACs, as it stated in Thomas Kwoyelo v. Uganda. Whether this may 
strengthen the individual rights of civilians in NIACs in comparison with civilians in 
IACs has not been further researched. It has been argued that a less developed body of 
law it is not alone a reason to adopt a pure human rights based approach, but a context-
specific analysis is needed.209 The one-sided implementation of humanitarian law 
through human rights bodies may entail the risk of transforming humanitarian law into a 
law applicable exclusively to states.210 Although the African Commission and the Afri-
can Court are mainly mandated to apply the African Charter, the Commission’s material 
jurisdiction extends further than the African Charter, due to which it has the competence 
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to adjudicate the Maputo Protocol.211 Maputo Protocol makes specific reference to IHL 
in article 11, requiring for the state parties to respect the rules of international humani-
tarian law that affect the population, ’particularly women’.212 Article 11 of the Maputo 
Protocol will be further discussed in the following chapter.  
3.4.3 References to article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention 
General Comment No. 31 of the Human Rights Committee exemplifies the principle of 
systemic integration with the statement “... more specific rules of international humani-
tarian law may be specially relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of Covenant 
rights”213, by making implicit reference to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention. 
Todeschini further notes that the Committee refrains from any reference to the lex spe-
cialis principle also in this connection.214 General Comment No. 31 further acknowl-
edges that the ICCPR imposes a duty on States to provide domestic remedies for viola-
tions of its provisions, including the possibility to obtain full redress,215 while at the 
same time, a breach of IHL that translates into a violation of the ICCPR will entitle the 
individual to seek redress against a state accountable for the violation.216 In its conclud-
ing observations, the Human Rights Committee has stated that states need to make re-
dress available for victims of human rights and IHL violations occurred during armed 
conflicts.217 Similar to the African Commission’s approach based on articles 60 and 61 
of the African Charter, the Human Rights Committee seems to consider IHL as interpre-
tative inspiration in finding violations of the ICCPR.  
 
The African Court on human and peoples’ rights has so far only dealt with one case 
where it has addressed an armed conflict; the decision on provisional measures against 
Libya. Though the African Court makes mention to factors violating “human rights and 
international humanitarian law”218, it does not itself draw from humanitarian law. It, 
however, calls on Libya to end actions violating both the African Charter and addition-
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ally, ‘other international human rights instruments to which it is party’.219 Considering 
the African Commission's assessment in the DRC decision, whether the African Court 
considers the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols ’other international 
human rights instruments’ on which it is specifically allowed to draw, seems unlike-
ly.220 They would rather be characterised as other international treaties or general prin-
ciples of international law, referred to in article 61 of the African Charter, at least. The 
question of whether the African Court’s interpretation is categorized under article 61 or 
under the principle of systemic integration does not seem relevant, since both refer to 
fairly similar sources of international law.  
 
Hailbronner recommends an approach that according to the article 61 of the African 
Charter, IHL could only be considered as ‘subsidiary measures’, implying a subsidiary 
role of IHL, helping to fill gaps and give content to Charter provisions while assisting 
with their application in practise.221 This approach would provide clarity and predicta-
bility to the deliberations of the human rights bodies. The possible disproportional effect 
of this approach on international armed conflicts, in comparison with non-international 
armed conflicts, would need to be further studied but is outside the scope of this thesis. 
While Chapter 2.1 concludes that under IHL there is no individual right to claim repara-
tions, it must also be noted that nothing in IHL precludes the right to reparation.222 
Greenwood affirms that the monitoring mechanisms of human rights conventions could 
be used in an indirect way to assist in ensuring compliance with IHL.223 As both the 
Human Rights Committee and the African Commission and the Court, in their own 
ways, take IHL into considerations in finding violations of their respective conventions, 
an individual has the possibility to access a human rights body in cases where both bod-
ies of law apply. The matter of how much foothold human rights bodies have already 
taken in the matter in terms of reparations in an armed conflict settings and gendered 
violence, will be looked at next.  
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4 REPARATIONS FOR GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN AF-
RICA 
4.1 Reparations for violations of human rights law on the African 
continent  
4.1.1 Gender-based violence as discrimination  
Due to the increased awareness of the gendered effects of armed conflicts and human 
rights violations taking place during them, a gender approach to reparations has some-
what gained international attention. The ICC, in its first ever reparations case, highlight-
ed the need of all victims to be considered, particularly the victims of sexual or gender 
violence, among other vulnerable groups. This meant that reparation should be granted 
and implemented without any discrimination, such as regards to age, ethnicity, political 
belief or gender.224 The Human Rights Committee has also noted gender-based violence 
but has mostly focused on it by statements in the reviewing of the country reports.225 
The African Commission has passed a number of resolutions calling on member states 
to guarantee the victims of sexual and gender-based violence the right to just and equi-
table reparation.226  
 
The acknowledgement of gender-violence as a form of discrimination may assists in 
detecting gender-based human rights violations. In the case of Egyptian Initiative for 
Personal Rights and Interights v Egypt227 the African Commission expressly found that 
the violations that have taken place were gender-based violence, a form of discrimina-
tion.228 More specifically, the African Commission found the Egyptian government re-
sponsible for discrimination against the victims in violation of articles 2 and 18(3). The 
victims had alleged a series of human rights violations, such as sexual assault, commit-
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ted during a demonstration by the Egyptian authorities, amounting to discrimination and 
furthermore a violation of their dignity and ill treatment in violation of Article 5. The 
African Commission held that the incidents were targeted at the women participating or 
present at the demonstration, and were perpetrated, even though the perpetrators them-
selves seemed to be aware of the effect of these type of violations in the context of the 
Egyptian society, an Arab Muslim society where women’s virtue is measured by keep-
ing herself physically and sexually unexposed except to her husband.229 Compensation 
was awarded, according to the applicants requested amount, for the physical and emo-
tional damage and trauma suffered. The Commission found that the acts were perpetrat-
ed by state actors or/and non-state actors under the control of state actors.230 In no point 
did the Commission refer to any of its resolutions on gender-based violence and repara-
tions, which i.e. provide guidance in ensuring that reparation afforded to victims of sex-
ual violence is adequate and comprehensive, in particular in the light of “the extent of 
physical and psychological trauma that women and girls face as a result of sexual vio-
lence.”231 I.e. the Resolution on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Women and 
Girls Victims of Sexual Violence calls on State parties to the African Charter to ensure 
accountability of perpetrators of sexual violence and to “put in place efficient and ac-
cessible reparation programmes that ensure information, rehabilitation and compensa-
tion for victims of sexual violence.”232. Had it done so, it could have with the support of 
the instrument, awarded measures specifically tailored to address the gender aspects of 
the violations for which it found the State responsible.233  
 
More broadly related to discrimination, the African Commission has addressed discrim-
ination and draw use of other sources of international law. In African Institute for Hu-
man Rights and Development (on behalf of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea) v. Re-
public of Guinea a radio speech by the President of Guinea encouraged the armed forces 
and citizens of Guinea to engage in mass discrimination against Sierra Leonean refugees 
in Guinea, resulting in a number of human rights violations against refugees, including 
the widespread rape of Sierra Leonean women in Guinea.234As provided by articles 60 
and 61 of the Charter, the Commission yet again found it appropriate to look into the 
principles and standards of international law, especially drawing use of international 
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refugee law.235 The Commission found, among other articles, a violation of article 2, 4 
and 5 of the African Charter. It did not specify which actions fell under which article, 
but it did take note of the complainants allegation that the speech gave rise to “wide-
spread sexual violence against the Sierra Leonean women in Guinea with the Guinean 
soldiers using rape as a weapon to discriminate against the refugees and to punish them 
for being so-called rebels.” The African Commission also noted that “the complainants 
contend that the violence described in the statements made under oath was undeniably 
coercive, especially since the soldiers and the civilians used arms to intimidate and 
threaten the women before and during the forced sexual relations.”236  
 
The case approaches violence against women through discrimination, instead of leaning 
on provisions on torture. This is most likely because of the group of victims was clearly 
identified as refugees, ‘women’ not being the only common factor. Discriminatory prac-
tices have further been found, now with a specific reference to gender, in Institute for 
Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Esmaila Connateh & 13 Others) 
v Republic of Angola where the Commission ordered the country to “ensure that immi-
gration policies, measures and legislations do not have the effect of discriminating 
against persons on the basis of any prohibited ground (including race, colour, descent, 
national, ethnic origin, or any other status), and particularly take into account the vul-
nerability of women, children and asylum seekers.”237 The resembling connection, this 
time to asylum seekers, but also to women and children, can be identified.  
4.1.2 Sexual violence as torture 
Sexual violence, a form of gender-based violence, cannot necessarily always be identi-
fied as discrimination, and in its gravest forms, a different acknowledgement and classi-
fication is at place. Article 14 of the Convention against Torture (CAT) stipulates the 
right of victims of torture to redress.238 As a customary norm of international law, the 
prohibition of torture has been recognized already in the Lieber Code239 and further in 
Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions where it prohibits “cruel treatment and 
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torture” and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment” of civilians and persons hors de combat.240 While no explicit reference to 
gender-based or sexual violence is made, there is international consensus on the extreme 
gravity of rape as a form of human rights violation. The characterization of rape as tor-
ture has been affirmed, in addition to the Committee against Torture,241 by other human 
rights treaty bodies.242 As a non-derogable norm of international law, the prohibition of 
torture and the characterization of rape as torture provides a strong foundation for a 
right to reparations for situations where rape has for been used as a weapon of warfare.  
 
The Committee for the Prevention of Torture in Africa issued in 2017 a General Com-
ment No. 4 considering the right to redress for victims of torture and other cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment.243 The General Comment specifically refers to “those acts 
of sexual and gender-based violence that amount to a form of torture and other ill-
treatment, (…) such as rape”244 and highlights both the applicability of human rights 
norms during armed conflicts and the need for state parties to adopt specific measures to 
ensure that victims of sexual and gender-based violence obtain redress. The paragraphs 
on sexual and gender-based violence explicitly state that the “acts of sexual violence, 
particularly rape, are also systematically used as a tool of war in armed conflict”.245 The 
General Comment does not address all gender-based violations taking place during 
armed conflicts but it does serve as recognition of the issue in its gravest forms.  
 
Though the African Commission has not eagerly used references to its resolutions in its 
decisions, a resolution more specific to the African context needs to be mentioned. The 
African Commission has in 2002 adopted the Resolution on Guidelines and Measures 
for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment in Africa’ (the Robben Island Guidelines), that provide among oth-
er duties the obligation to provide reparation to victims of torture and ill-treatment.246 
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The international recognition of rape as torture247 ties the resolution to gender-based 
violence on the African continent, reinforcing the need to address and respond to the 
needs of victims through reparations. According to the Robben Island Guidelines, an 
obligation to provide reparation exists regardless of a successful criminal prosecution.248  
 
Regarding findings on torture, the Human Rights Committee has only occasionally 
clearly articulated the obligation of the state party to provide (medical) assistance, 
though as Evans notes, it is widely agreed that victims of torture generally require not 
only immediate medical attention, but also rehabilitation.249 This serves yet as another 
example of the little attention to remedies the Human Rights Committee has given in its 
jurisprudence. Evans notes that this may be due to the absence of consultations with the 
victim on remedies as the complaint is under consideration.250 Though the normative 
framework around torture, and rape as torture is undoubtedly strong, the Human Rights 
Committee jurisprudence related to reparations for torture does not provide additional 
strength to victims of gender-based violence.  
4.1.3 Gender-specific human rights instruments and reparations 
In addition to successfully being identified as forms of violations such as discrimination 
and torture, gender-based violence has been identified through the creation of treaties 
and treaty bodies focused on the elimination of gender-based violence. As a gender-
specific treaty body, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Wom-
en has recommended, among other things, that states parties to the Convention “provide 
and enforce appropriate, timely remedies for discrimination against women”. The rec-
ommendations further specify remedies as i.e. restitution, compensation and rehabilita-
tion, 251 but also goes on to recommend the creation of women specific funds to guaran-
tee the receipt of reparations in situations in which the violating party is unable or un-
willing to provide such reparations.252 By naming remedies constituting reparations, the 
recommendation draws a line from remedy to reparations. More specific to gender-
                                                
247 See, e.g., Delalić case, Judgment (§§ 1328 and 1731) (ICTY); Aydin v. Turkey (§§ 1344 and 1741) 
(ECHR); Case 10.970 (Peru) (paras. 1349 and 1743) (IACtHR). 
248 Robben Island Guidelines, para. 50.  
249 Evans (2012) p. 49-50, referring to cases where the petitioners were found to be victims of torture; but 
where no mention is made in the decisions regarding medical attention and rehabilitation: Isidore 
Kanana v. Zaire, No. 366/1989, Final Views, 8 November 1993; Rodrı´guez v. Uruguay, No. 322/1988, 
Final Views, 9 August 1994; Ndong Bee v. Equatorial Guinea, Nos 1152/2003 and 1190/2003, Final 
Views, 30 November 2005. 
250 Evans (2012) p. 50.  
251 CEDAW (2015) General recommendation No. 33 on women’s access to justice, para 19(a–b). 
252 CEDAW (2015) General recommendation No. 33 on women’s access to justice, para 19(d). 
44 
based violence in armed conflicts and post-conflict settings, the recommendation calls 
for different forms of institutional reforms in accordance with international human 
rights standards, and the rejection of amnesties for gender-based human rights viola-
tions.253 In connection with the institutional reform, the text acknowledges the Nairobi 
Declaration Women’s and Girls Right to a Remedy and Reparation, a declaration high-
lighting the access for women and girls to reparations.254  
 
The recommendation could be considered a document helping to connect human rights 
instruments pronouncing on remedies, to actual reparations for violations taking place 
in conflict settings. While Musila has noted that the term ‘remedy’, found in article 2(3) 
of the African Charter, does not equal reparations but rather covers a range of measures 
that include, but are not limited to, declarations, compensation and reparation,255 the 
evidence points to the willingness of the African Commission to interpret the Charter as 
a document allowing for the providing of reparations, even if the reparations recom-
mended have sometimes been read into a ‘right to remedy’, rather than ‘a right to repa-
rations’ per se.256 The African Commission has not, however, often referred to resolu-
tions or other reinforcing documents but rather seemed to come to conclusions without 
shedding light on all the factors considered in the analysis of cases, making the evalua-
tion of the weight of resolutions and declarations difficult. On the other hand, the lack 
of references to additional instruments may acts as proof that the African Commission 
does not consider the question as a controversial one.  
 
The African Court has in one case, APDF & IHRDA v Republic of Mali257 found a vio-
lation of the Maputo Protocol, relating to harmful traditional practices, ordering Mali to 
amend its national law to ensure it abides by its obligation under the Maputo Protocol, 
among other sources of international law. Budoo argues that it would be safe to assume 
the African Court would not hesitate to give another verdict against a country violating 
the Maputo Protocol, if all the preliminary conditions were met. Budoo however states 
that in most cases the admissibility requirements have been difficult to satisfy. A mem-
ber state needs to make a declaration under article 34(6) of the African Court Protocol258 
for NGOs to be able to access the Court.259 The fact that for an NGO to bring a case 
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against a state requires this action from the states themselves, possibly charged with 
violations against them, seems a rather laborious procedure, negatively affecting the 
actualization of the rights of the individual.   
 
Gender-based violence in an armed conflict was considered directly in the DRC case, 
where approximately 2,000 HIV-positive Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers raped Congo-
lese women and young girls in order to spread AIDS to the Congolese population.260 
The DRC brought the complaint asserting, among other things, that the mass rape and 
deliberate infection of women and girls with HIV constituted a violation of human 
rights under the African Charter. By referring to both articles 60 and 61 of the Charter, 
the African Commission held that the Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Pro-
tocols are to be taken into consideration as subsidiary measures to determine the princi-
ples of international law.261 The African Commission noted that the alleged acts of vio-
lence against women are prohibited under article 76 of the First Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions (Protection of Women), as well as are offensive to both the 
African Charter and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women.262 How these breaches were found, the Commission does not elaborate 
on. Among other articles, the African Commission found violations of articles 18(1) and 
(3), apparently since it also found violations of the CEDAW. In addition to ordering an 
immediate withdrawal of the offending states’ armed forces, the Commission requested 
adequate reparations to be paid to the DRC for the victims of human rights violations 
committed.263 The complaint was brought to the African Commission by the DRC on 
behalf of its citizens. Whether this factor had an impact on the large amount of IHL re-
ferred to in the communication is not evident. The Maputo Protocol, specifically requir-
ing states to establish services for i.e. reparation for victims of violence against women 
was adopted after the case, in July 2003.  
 
There is currently no case law on the application of article 11 of the Maputo Protocol 
and reparations in the African Court. However, the fact that the Maputo Protocol direct-
ly addresses reparations and violence against women in armed conflicts could be con-
sidered a development towards a more consistent realisation of reparations for an indi-
vidual. Viljoen suggest that the formulation of article 11(3) of the Maputo Protocol in-
corporates the corpus of IHL – both treaty-based and customary law, at least as far as it 
relates to women – into the Protocol, and therefore brings those provisions under the 
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jurisdiction of the African Commission and the Court.264 Viljoen suggests, based on his 
assumption that the African Commission has also not yet developed a firm stance on the 
role of international humanitarian law in its jurisprudence265, that it developed a more 
consistent approach, in line with the DRC findings, also highlighting its mandate that is 
not restricted to the African Charter alone. It could rely on IHL in an increasing manner 
even as the source of violations in respects of treaties it has jurisdiction over, such as the 
Maputo Protocol, already applied by the African Court.266 Considering the DRC case 
that involved state parties rather than an individual on one side, it remains difficult to 
assess whether similar line of rulings would affect the standing of an individual in terms 
of reparations.  
 
As the flow of cases in front of the African Court is most likely not going to significant-
ly rise and therefore not remarkably affect the access to justice for individuals in prac-
tice, the emphasis on the handling of cases related to gender-based violations taking 
places on armed conflicts will remain on other human rights bodies. The reference to 
the Maputo Protocol by the African Court is however, a valuable one, and since the Af-
rican Commission has, similarly to the references to IHL, referred to CEDAW, and is 
likely to follow to adjudicate the Protocol as its jurisdiction also covers it.   
4.1.4 The responsibility of states for non-state actors to provide reparations 
As human rights typically protect the individual against the abuse of state powers, mod-
ern warfare poses a challenge regarding the state’s ability to protect its citizens. The 
relevance of the question of the responsibility of states for the actions of non-state ac-
tors is evident in armed conflicts of a non-international character and conflicts with 
multiple parties to the conflict. Relevant also to the definition of torture, the CAT defi-
nition refers to a public official or a person acting in an official capacity,267 not address-
ing private parties or the states’ responsibility regarding them. However, the Human 
Rights Committee’s General comment 31 describes state responsibility to provide repa-
ration for acts of torture or ill-treatment committed by private actors in cases where 
states have not succeeded in taking appropriate measures or in exercising “due diligence 
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to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish such non-state officials or private ac-
tors.”268 The Inter-American Court has also addressed the issue of due diligence and the 
requirements of it in its jurisprudence, which will be discussed in the next sub-chapter 
in comparison with the African Commission’s jurisprudence. 
 
One of the first African Commission cases dealing with gender-based violence, Zimba-
bwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, was the one to establish that a state can 
be held accountable for the violations committed by private actors. The complainant 
argued that even if the alleged perpetrators were not agents of the government, the gov-
ernment would still be held liable for a violation of the African Charter, since the gov-
ernment has an obligation under article 1 of the Charter to ensure that people within its 
jurisdiction are treated in accordance with international norms and standards,269 likely 
assuming the African Commission would go on to determine whether the state had ful-
filled its due diligence obligation or not and could be held responsible for violations 
conducted by private actors.  
 
The African Commission did refer to the well-known Velásquez Rodriguez case of the 
Inter-American Court of Human rights, where the Inter-American Court affirmed that 
states must prevent, investigate and punish any violation recognized by the Conven-
tion.270 It was stated that if the state did not address mass rape with due diligence, the 
state itself could be held accountable. More specifically, the African Commission held 
that that a “State can be held complicit where it fails systematically to provide protec-
tion of violations from private actors who deprive any person of his/her human rights.” 
The African Commission did, however, note that “unlike for direct State action, the 
standard for establishing State responsibility in violations committed by private actors is 
more relative”, and it is demonstrated by establishing that the state confines a pattern of 
abuse through pervasive non-action. To avoid complicity, “States must demonstrate due 
diligence by taking active measures to protect, prosecute and punish private actors who 
commit abuses.”271 Similar approach was encouraged by the African Commission’s Fair 
Trial and Legal Assistance Guidelines that recommend the state to investigate and pun-
ish all complaints of violence against women, whether the alleged acts are perpetrated 
by the state, its officials or agents or by private persons, and that ensure a non-
discriminatory approach towards victims.272 
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The case offers some clarity on the boundaries of the responsibility of the state opposed 
to non-state actors in the African regional system. The African Commission found that 
the state had exercised due diligence in its response to the violence: “it had investigated 
the allegations, amended some of its laws and in some cases, paid compensation to vic-
tims.” According to the African Commission, ”it suffices for the state to demonstrate 
that the measures taken were proportionate to deal with the situation” and the fact that 
“all the allegations could not be investigated does not make the state liable for viola-
tions committed by non-state actors.”273 The African Commission has also in the case of 
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v Egypt274 highlighted the control 
exercised over the non-state perpetrators by the state of Egypt as a factor establishing 
responsibility.275 
 
It has been suggested that the African Commission is starting to develop a more solid 
line of reasoning regarding the obligation of states for the illegal acts of non-state ac-
tors,276 since it has addressed the issue in other cases, i.e.  the complaint focused on the 
behaviours of an oil consortium between the state oil company and Shell in Nigeria. 277  
Whether this development will address actors such as armed groups or private military 
companies is not evident but could naturally follow as complaints in front of the African 
Commission emerge.  
 
4.2 Comparison to the approach of the Inter-American human 
rights treaty bodies on gender-based violence  
4.2.1 Reparations for violence against women in the Inter-American Human 
rights system 
Celorio has researched the Inter-American human rights instruments and their applica-
tion by the Inter-American Court and the Commission of human rights and has identi-
fied a time period (”The First line of Merits Rulings by the Inter-American Commis-
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sion”), 1994-2001, during which the commission, according to the author, began to set 
standards in several areas, including ”the obligation of States, including their respective 
judicial branches, to act with the due diligence necessary and without delay to prevent, 
investigate, sanction, and offer reparations for acts of violence against women, even 
when the acts are perpetrated by non-State actors.”278 As the conditions for reparations 
to be granted, the author also notes that standards regarding ”the obligation to guarantee 
a de jure and de facto access to adequate and effective judicial remedies when acts of 
violence against women occur” was set.” The legal characterization of rape as torture 
when perpetrated by public officials is also brought up.279  
 
A second line of ruling in 2007-2009, giving more content to the standards, strength-
ened the Court’s ability to rule on women’s rights.280 According to the author, the main 
contributions of three specific judgements related to gender-based violence include 
among others the jurisprudence on reparations.281 An analysis on the scope of the state 
obligation provides a useful parallel that the norms applicable and their manifestation in 
the case law of the African Commission and the Court will be compared with. The obli-
gation of states to investigate, sanction and offer reparations for gender-based violations 
of human rights, an element derived from Celorio’s study, will be discussed regarding 
the jurisprudence related to gender-based violence on the African continent. More re-
cent case law from the Inter-American Court will also be taken into consideration re-
garding the obligations concerning the acts of non-state actors.282 Whether and in which 
way these obligations may be influenced by IHL, during an armed conflict, will be dis-
cussed.  
 
Though Cotton Field does not refer to IHL, the Inter-American Court has had several 
cases that have allowed it to consider IHL as a source of interpretation of the Inter-
American Convention, such as situations of internal armed conflicts, where both IHL 
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and human rights law apply.283 It has also emphasized the protective aspect of IHL, de-
riving from Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions, and the Additional Protocol 
II thereto, providing the individual with not only passive protection, but also requiring 
the state to impede violations against third parties.284 
 
While on one hand the case law of the Inter-American Court and the Commission dis-
cussed here only have authority related to the specific rights they concern, it can also 
guide states on how to effectively implement the rights contained in their respective 
instruments at the national level.285 The guidance-providing dimension of the case law 
serves as an interpretative aid for the purposes of this thesis. In order to establish the 
length the two systems functioning in realms of traditional justice mechanisms have 
gone to pronounce on reparations for gender-based violence, a comparison is helpful.  
 
4.2.2 The obligations of a state or a non-state actor to prevent and investigate as 
foundation for reparations 
Celorio highlights the role of certain cases in enhancing the nature of the state obliga-
tions related to due diligence and access to justice when the victims are at the risk of 
facing violations of human rights on the basis of factors such as their age, race, ethnici-
ty, gender and multiple others.286 In Cotton Field, the Inter-American Court, by con-
firming its competency to review claims under the Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (the Convention 
of Belém do Pará)287, opened a door for future petitions alleging human rights violations 
with gender-specific causes, in the realm of violence against women. Building on Cot-
ton Field, the Inter-American Court has in its later case law reiterated what it had al-
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ready found constituting ’violence against women’.288 The obligations identified in Cot-
ton Field have been identified in multiple cases such as Raquel Martin de Mejía v. Pe-
ru,289 Morales de Dierra v. Guatemala290, González Pérez v. Mexico291 and Da Penha 
Maia Fernandes v. Brazil292. 
 
The factors identified in the creation of a state obligation related to due diligence and 
access to justice, highlighted in Cotton Field were the recognition of the gravity of the 
problem of violence against women and the ”culture of discrimination” influencing the 
society, reports by international actors indicating the actions were manifestations of 
gender-based violence, the disadvantaged position of the victims and the evidence 
demonstrating that the victims had suffered forms of ill-treatment and probably sexual 
abuse before they had been murdered.293 The Inter-American Court recognized that the 
State had the obligation to adopt all the positive measures necessary to guarantee the 
rights of girls, within a context of known disappearances, because they formed a group 
at particular risk to human rights violations.294 Celorio considered the judgement to 
highlight link between discrimination and violence against women, following the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against women.295  
 
Cotton Field provides clarity of the scope and the content of the state obligation in cases 
of violence against women particularly in the realms of prevention, investigation, and 
reparations from the perspective of gender-based violence and discrimination.296 When 
it comes to prevention, the Inter-American Court found that the obligation includes the 
adoption of legal, public policy and institutional measures for the protection of women 
from risk factors and the prevention of acts of violence.297 Celorio notes that the Inter-
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American Court specifically refers to ‘strict due diligence’, even though it does take 
into account its precedent about the limited responsibility of the state for human rights 
violations committed by private individuals and the requirement of knowledge of a situ-
ation of real and immediate danger in order to incur liability. The strict due diligence 
obligation arises in a known context of serious acts of violence against women.298  
 
Similar obligations can be found in the realm of IHL. Where Cotton Field elaborates on 
the obligation to prevent, IHL, in order to prevent serious violations of its protective 
provisions during a conflict, contains a foundational obligation to implement. Accord-
ing to the Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the state has an obli-
gation to ensure national implementation of IHL, which will contribute to preventing 
serious violations of its provisions during a conflict, making the transition process after 
the hostilities have ended much more viable.299 Article 76 of the Additional Protocol I 
to the Geneva Conventions elaborates even further and considers women as ”the object 
of special respect” stating that they ”shall be protected in particular against rape, forced 
prostitution and any other form of indecent assault.”300 The implementation of this spe-
cial obligation of ”special respect” serves as prevention of the listed violations. The ex-
plicit mention of women to be considered with ”special respect” could be considered a 
due diligence of some type in the realm of IHL.  
 
The Inter-American Court states that the obligation to investigate human rights viola-
tions in the general context of violence against women is, in addition to be performed in 
a prompt, serious, impartial and an exhaustive manner, has a “wider scope”.301 It also 
highlights the negative and positive obligations of the State in cases of violence against 
women, including the obligation to remove all factual and juridical obstacles to the due 
investigation of the facts and the conduct of the proceedings and also to ensure that in-
vestigations have a gender perspective.302  
 
Despite the importance of investigations, there is a lack of detail about the standards, 
principles and international law on investigations relevant to investigations in armed 
conflicts. In addition to provisions on providing for effective penal sanctions for persons 
suspected of having committed or ordering the commission of ”graves breaches” and 
”other serious violations of the laws and customs of war” (synonymous with ”war 
                                                
298 Celorio (2011) p. 848, referring to Cotton Field paras 283 and 409.  
299 Salmn (2006) p. 328 
300 AP I Article 76.  
301 Cotton Field para 293.  
302 Cotton Field para 455(b) 
53 
crimes”),303 Salm argues there is a duty under customary international law to prosecute 
those who have committed violations of the laws and customs of war in a non-
international armed conflict.304 Though amnesties sometimes come up in the aftermath 
of a conflict, violations of international law are generally not what amnesties are aimed 
at. The United Nations Human Rights Committee, on the subject of torture, has stated 
that: “Amnesties are generally incompatible with the duty of States to investigate such 
acts; to guarantee freedom from such acts within their jurisdiction; and to ensure that 
they do not occur in the future.”305 For its part, the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights has asserted that it is necessary to “…ensure compatibility of recourse to the 
granting of amnesties or pardons for persons who have risen up in arms against the State 
with the State’s obligation to clarify, punish, and make reparation for violations of hu-
man rights and international humanitarian law…”306 The obligation to investigate is 
essentially linked to the obligation to make reparation.  
 
The Inter-American Court has also contributed to reparations per se, namely by stating 
which reparations should be awarded from a gender perspective. Though the content of 
reparations falls outside the scope of the thesis, it should be mentioned that the Inter-
American Court, setting a standard for the actualization of reparations, further elabo-
rates the obligation of states to guarantee adequate access to justice to victims and their 
family members, in order to obtain remedies in cases of discrimination and violence 
against women.307 It seems that the Inter-American Court will not address reparations 
separately from the due diligence obligations to prevent and investigate violations and it 
has stated that obstacles in the pursuit of justice may amount to serious violations of 
human rights.308  
4.2.3 The elements of gender-based violence in Cotton Field in comparison with 
the jurisprudence of the African Commission and the Court 
The African Commission has taken a similar approach to the Inter-American Court and 
the CEDAW Committee and identified the link between discrimination and gender-
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based violence. In EIPR and INTERIGHTS v. Egypt the violations that took place were 
specifically identified as gender-based violence, a form of discrimination.309 Similarly 
to Cotton Field, the high-risk culture of the Egyptian society was referred to in the Afri-
can Commissions reasoning. The African Commission took note of the fact that the 
perpetrators seemed to be aware of the context of the Egyptian society where the conse-
quences of their actions would yield especially severe consequences for women.310 In 
Cotton Field, the corresponding observation was further strengthened by several reports 
of international organisations indicating that the violations in question were manifesta-
tions of gender-based violence.311 The African Commission continues to state that the 
perpetrators were aware of the consequences of such acts on the victims and their fami-
lies.312 Both the Inter-American Court and the African Commission refer to a similar 
factor; the Inter-American Court further leaning on the international acknowledgement 
of the state of the society.  
 
A third element that the Inter-American Court highlighted in Cotton Field was that it 
was proved that the victims suffered of physical ill treatment and very probably sexual 
abuse.313 In EIPR and INTERIGHTS v. Egypt the African Commission also acknowl-
edged the physical injuries and emotional trauma established by medical reports.314 The 
African Commission additionally noted that the physical assaults described were gen-
der-specific as the acts occurred could only be directed to women, and highlights that 
the victims were targeted in this manner because of their gender.315 As another element, 
the African Commission notes that the threats and accusations of the victims for practic-
ing prostitution, when they refused to withdraw their complaints can also be character-
ized as gender-specific.316 As a fourth element in Cotton Field the Inter-American Court 
highlighted the disadvantageous position of the victims; they were young, socioeconom-
ically disadvantaged women who were workers or students.317 In EIPR and IN-
TERIGHTS v. Egypt all the victims were female journalists who had different reasons 
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for being present at the time the assaults took place; the first victim was only passing 
by, the second was covering the events in her capacity as a journalist.318  
 
Similar recognition of the vulnerable or disadvantageous position of the group of vic-
tims (in addition to the fact that they were women living in a society characterized by “a 
culture of discrimination”) was not made in EIPR and INTERIGHTS v. Egypt, apparent-
ly since the victims had a different common denominator; they were all journalists, 
though not all present in their official capacities. The African Commission has, howev-
er, identified groups by referring to refugees in African Institute for Human Rights and 
Development (on behalf of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea) v. Republic of Guinea. 
The African Commission referred to international refugee law by reference to articles 
60 and 61 of the African Charter and stated that in that particular case rape had been 
used as a weapon to discriminate against refugees.319  
 
The African Commission is yet to follow the example of the Inter-American Court re-
garding the Inter-American Convention and the Convention of Belém do Pará, and 
elaborate on the link of obligations enshrined in the Charter and in the Maputo Protocol. 
As noted earlier, the Maputo Protocol can be seen to incorporate IHL, and has already 
been applied by the African Court. The African Commission could also strengthen its 
argumentation in future cases by aiming to identify particular factors of vulnerability, 
which often characterizes especially victims of armed conflict, in order to create con-
sistency and strength.  In EIPR and INTERIGHTS v. Egypt, identifying the women’s 
occupation as a common denominator could have perhaps lead to suspecting violations 
of another kind, for example freedom of expression. The issue with the African Com-
mission’s statement lies in the fact that gender-based violence does not only appear 
through acts that can be ’only directed to women’. Though this was not the only reason 
behind identifying gender-based violence, it cannot be considered an element creating a 
solid reasoning to build on.  
 
The existence of an armed conflict is unlikely to alter the definition of gender-based 
violence. The consideration of women as the object of ‘special respect’ would in itself 
suggest IHL assumes the vulnerable position of women in armed conflicts straightfor-
wardly. When considering IHL as an interpretive aid in applying the quite broadly for-
mulated Charter rights, the African Commission could possibly strengthen its definition 
of gender-based violence by drawing inspiration from IHL that seems to highlight the 
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specific needs for protection afforded to women, at least in international armed con-
flicts.320 
4.2.4 The scope of state obligations to prevent, investigate and offer reparations in 
Cotton Field in comparison with the jurisprudence of the African Commis-
sion and the Court  
On the state obligation to prevent violations of human rights, the Inter-American Court 
in Cotton Field highlighted the obligation to adopt legal, public policy and institutional 
measures to protect women from risk factors and prevent violence and referred to “strict 
due diligence” with respect to a report of missing women and the efforts to locate them 
during the first hours and days, since there was a real and imminent risk of them being 
ill-treated and killed.321 In a more narrow way, the African Commission previously in 
SERAC case affirmed the governments’ “duty to protect their citizens, … through ap-
propriate legislation and affective enforcement.”322 The approaches are fairly alike, 
however, the African Commission does not refer to due diligence in any stricter manner 
when it comes to gender-based violations. It does, however, emphasize that the said 
obligation involves the protection of citizens from damaging acts that may be perpetrat-
ed by private parties.323 In EIPH INTERIGHTS v Egypt, the African Commission made 
an observation that it was evident that the victim’s had not been protected from the per-
petrators and other actors during the events that took place, referring to an obligation to 
protect.324  The African Commission has further leaned on the Inter-American Court’s 
pronouncements, the ‘due diligence principle’, on a state’s responsibility also for viola-
tions not directly imputable to the state.325 The reference to a ‘more relative’ standard 
i.e. the need to establish that the state confines a patterns of pervasive non-action was 
brought up in Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, with a requirement 
to take measures to offer protection and to prosecute and punish private actors who 
commit abuses.326   
 
                                                
320 Article 76 of the Additional Protocol I, applicable in international armed conflicts.  
321 Cotton Field para 283.  
322 SERAC case para 57.  
323 SERAC case para 57.  
324 EIPH INTERIGHTS v Egypt para. 137(b) 
325 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe para 115. The African Commisison refers to the 
Inter-American Court’s observation in the Velásquez Rodriguez case (para. 172) that a lack of due dili-
gence to prevent the violation or to respond to is as required by the Convention can lead to international 
responsibility of the state.  
326 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, para. 160.  
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The African Commission also found that state responsibility can be generated by the 
lack of due diligence in preventing the violation or for not taking necessary steps in 
providing victims with reparation.327 Reparations seem to be interlinked with the duty to 
prevent and offer protection also in the jurisprudence on the African Commission. The 
influence of IHL provisions on the due diligence obligation needs to be discussed to 
understand the effect of an armed conflict. Though the African Commission will not 
pronounce on violations other than the instruments it is mandated to apply, mainly the 
Charter, it has found Charter violations by reference to IHL and by virtue of articles 60 
and 61 of the Charter. In the DRC case, the African Commission found a violation of 
the Charter by considering Article 76 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Con-
ventions. 328 By taking this article referring to “special respect of women” into consider-
ation, stricter due diligence obligations regarding violations against women during 
armed conflict would possibly become applied.  
 
Building on the principles of international law, the Inter-American Court stated it based 
its decisions in the matter on article 63(1) of the American Convention, the article on 
remedy and compensation.329 Though the Inter-American Court has in cases such Cot-
ton Field simply referred back to the principle that any violation of an international ob-
ligation resulting in harm entails the obligation to make adequate reparation, it has also 
connected the investigatory obligations to reparations. In Cotton Field it referred to the 
Inter-American Commission, who has indicated that  “a full reparation requires that the 
state investigate the disappearances and subsequent murders (of the victims) with due 
diligence and impartiality, and exhaustively, in order to clarify the historic truth of the 
facts. To this end, the State must adopt all necessary judicial and administrative 
measures to complete the investigation, find, prosecute and punish the perpetrator or 
perpetrators and mastermind or masterminds and provide full information on the re-
sults.”330 Though there is a clear obligation in international law, followed by the Inter-
American Court’s jurisprudence on the obligation to make adequate reparation, the In-
ter-American Court finds that investigation and reparations are critically linked – there 
cannot be “full reparation” without an impartial and exhaustive investigation conducted 
with due diligence. The African Commission, in Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 
                                                
327 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, para 143.  
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v. Zimbabwe, similarly refers to Velásquez Rodríguez where providing victims with 
adequate compensation was essentially linked to other elements of state responsibility; 
investigation, prevention, identifying the responsible and punishing them appropriate-
ly.331 The African Commission similarly regards reparations, in the case at hand ’com-
pensation’, as an integral part of the due diligence process. Since, as earlier noted, state 
responsibility can be triggered by neglecting to take the steps to provide victims with 
reparations, the term compensation could be read to point to the full measure of differ-
ent forms of reparation.  
 
Cotton Field was the first case to establish that the obligation to investigate has a ‘wider 
scope’ when the case in question deals with a woman who had been killed, ill-treated 
and whose “personal liberty was affected within the framework of a general context of 
violence against women.”332 Referring to the approach taken by the European Court of 
Human Rights on racially motivated violence, the Inter-American Court held that the 
wider scope is necessary in order to reassert society’s condemnation of gender-based 
violence and to build and maintain the confidence of the group of people protected in 
the capabilities of the authorities to indeed offer them protection from the threat of gen-
der-based violence.333 The Inter-American Court highlighted the negative and positive 
obligations of the state in cases of violence against women, including the obligation to 
remove all factual and juridical obstacles to the proper investigation of the facts and 
also to ensure a gender perspective in the course of the investigation. By gender per-
spective it meant an investigation that had a specific line of inquiry related to sexual 
violence, and among other things, was conducted by officials trained in addressing dis-
crimination and gender-based violence.334 In EIPR and INTERIGHTS v. Egypt it was 
according to the African Commission evident, without an in-depth elaboration of the 
scope of the obligation, that the state had not fulfilled its obligation, since it had failed 
to conduct an effective investigation and hold anyone accountable.335 The state’s obliga-
tion to investigate does not stand out in the case law of the African Commission as a 
separate element so much as it is mentioned in connection with the obligation to prevent 
violations, in reference to the requirement of due diligence. IHL does not similarly con-
nect the obligation to investigate to reparations. However, since the efforts to identify a 
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pure, individual right to reparation have not been successful in practise, allowing the 
mutual reinforcement of IHL and human rights law to enter the sphere of investigations 
could possibly have an effect on the content of the obligation to investigate, and, possi-
bly highlight the reparatory dimension.  
 
The Inter-American Court, in determining the scope of investigation has clearly taken 
an approach with a goal to educate the society and reaffirm the values enshrined in the 
conventions, for example steer the society from the “culture of discrimination” towards 
a more egalitarian environment. Considering the nature of the African Commission’s 
decisions and recommendations as authoritative interpretations, yet not judgements per 
se, it may have a more difficult job if pursuing to follow this line of action. However, in 
its approach to due diligence, similar desire could be identified. Due diligence is dis-
cussed by the African Commission in many cases with the threat of attributing the re-
sponsibility for the acts of private and non-state actors directly or indirectly the state, if 
no effective investigation is being conducted. This might be evidence of a political mo-
tive in the work of the African Commission; an encouragement or a threat towards the 
states to actually start taking more extensive measures in guaranteeing the rights of their 
citizens. Essentially, the African Commission and the Inter-American Court are refer-
ring to a very similar element in the obligation to investigate: the need to push for 
change and, as the Inter-American Court further elaborated, to build and maintain the 
confidence of the group of people protected in the capabilities of the authorities to offer 
them protection. In a more recent case, the Inter-American Court directly notes that the 
states “must adopt the required measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of 
conduct of men and women and to eliminate prejudices, customary practices and other 
practices based on the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes, and on 
stereotyped roles for men and women.”336 The Inter-American Court carries this task 
out with a specific tool – the requirement for a “wider scope” in the investigation of 
gender-based violence in high-risk contexts. Whether the African Commission follows 
this line of rulings is to be discovered.  
 
The African Commission has for the time being addressed reparations specifically in 
gender-based violence related cases in a rather undefined manner. In the DRC case it 
recommended “adequate reparations be paid, according to the appropriate ways to the 
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Complainant State for and on behalf of the victims of the human rights” 337, without any 
specification or further requirements. Even more distantly, the African Commission has 
recommended that a commission to be established, to assess the losses of victim with a 
view to compensate them.338 Reparations, when mentioned by the African Commission, 
have been most regularly brought up in connection with cases concerning the legality or 
rather, unconstitutionality of amnesties, leading to situations where in theory, domestic 
remedies may have been available for victims, but “as a matter of practicality were not 
capable of yielding any prospect of success to the victims of the criminal assaults.”339  
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5 CONCLUSION  
Both criticism and praise have been raised about the blurring distinction between the 
two bodies of law; international humanitarian law and human rights law. Critics point to 
the fact that the increasing application of IHL by the regional human rights bodies 
might lead to IHL becoming fragmented in its application.340 On the other hand, the 
convergence, and more specifically, the influence of human rights law on other branch-
es of international law has been recognized having potential to strengthen the position 
of a victim of violations of international law.  
 
Though human rights law has undoubtedly affected the interpretation of international 
humanitarian law, a right to present reparation claims based in IHL towards a violating 
party of in armed conflict, is not sustainable. Human rights mechanism, however, pro-
vide an individual an access to a body receiving individual claims, since it has been 
thoroughly established that international human rights law does not cease to apply, even 
during armed conflicts. Though no explicit reparation clauses exist in human rights in-
struments applicable in Africa, both the African Commission and the Human Rights 
Committee have seen their respective instruments as ones granting and individual the 
right to reparation for violations of the conventions. The African regional system has 
awarded individuals with different forms of remedies, whereas the Human Rights 
Committee has in its Concluding observations highlighted the States’ responsibility in 
implementing the right to compensation and reparation. While the Human Rights 
Committee is clear on its position regarding the right to reparation and it has in its Con-
cluding observations suggested multiple remedies to improve the position of an individ-
ual, its stance has had little value to an individual claiming to be a victim. On the other 
hand, the lack of a reparation clause in both the ICCPR and the African Charter may 
have contributed to the formation of regional, quasi-judicial bodies with reparations 
mandates. 
 
Given the lack of mandate among IHL mechanisms to deal with non-international 
armed conflicts, mechanisms and bodies of other branches of international law such as 
the UN Commission on Human Rights, later the Human Rights Council, and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights have taken initiative in this regard. The ab-
sence of a formal mandate for international humanitarian law however restricts their 
practice. The African Commission has been suggested to have approached IHL as only 
a ‘subsidiary measure’, helping to fill gaps and give content to Charter provisions while 
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assisting with their application in practise. However, the African Commission’s ability 
to adjudicate the Maputo Protocol brings the corpus of IHL to the sphere of application 
of the Commission and the Court. It could rely on IHL in an increasing manner even as 
the source of violations.  
 
Human rights mechanisms lack the competence to deal directly with violations by 
armed groups, although they attempt to address them in reports or General Recommen-
dations, or by finding States responsible for omission or acquiescence in the face of 
violations by armed groups. As the Human Rights Committee has highlighted the state’s 
responsibility to prevent, protect and punish violations of human rights conducted by 
private, non-state actors, the African Commission has highlighted the states’ responsi-
bility for acts committed by armed groups. Though important developments for the in-
dividual, they does not address the issue in its entirety: if and when the state cannot be 
held responsible for the violations committed by armed groups, how can the individual 
access reparations, since the human rights mechanisms only regulate the relationship 
between the individual and the state?  
 
The Inter-American Court has taken significant steps in creating sustainable standards 
for state responsibility for violations of human rights, specifically on terms of gender-
based violence. Similar obligations to prevent, investigate and provide reparations for 
violations of human rights can be identified in the jurisprudence of the African Com-
mission, but to a lesser extent. The obligation to investigate is essentially interlinked 
with the obligation to provide reparations, through which the obligation to repair can 
been seen as strengthened on the African continent. In the context of an armed conflict, 
instruments such as the Maputo Protocol highlight the application of human rights, spe-
cifically women’s rights, and are moulding the bigger picture towards a more seamless 
interplay between the two regimes. Though consistency has not been reached in terms 
of creating a solid jurisprudence, there are likely to come plenty of opportunities to 
make it happen.  
 
Though the case law of both the African Commission and the Court and the Human 
Rights Committee have confirmed the existence of the right to reparation and have uti-
lized their respective treaty provisions in order to award individuals with reparations, a 
solid and accomplished jurisprudence on the actualisation of the right to reparation in 
armed conflicts cannot yet be detected. The given acknowledgements about the exist-
ence of a right to reparation have, however, very likely contributed to the number of 
initiatives and resolutions on the topic specifically. When the concept of a ‘right to repa-
ration’ for gender-based violations in armed conflicts is still to be consistently executed, 
another question regarding the practicalities of reparations needs to be asked. If the tra-
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ditional forms of justice are being utilized and effective reparations awarded through 
them, is a strengthened ‘right to reparation’ even necessary on the continent? In the af-
termath of a conflict, the vast number of claims puts unusual pressure on the legal sys-
tems and in those situations traditional forms of justice may prove more efficient and 
prompter in responding to victim’s needs. Additional questions arise, relating to the 
needs of the victim: Is ‘official recognition’ needed, and what constitutes ‘official’ for 
the victims? In order to find out the actual effectiveness and gain from the reparation 
regime applicable in Africa from a victim-perspective, a study on the ground, compar-
ing the non-judicial, traditional mechanisms and their effectiveness to the judicial ones 
would need to be conducted.  
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